Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)
The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - military actions between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
In the fall of 1991, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were repealed. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, led by Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.
The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) of regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and the North Caucasus republics and etc.
On December 9, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.
On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.
(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes, 2004)
The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops; the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the assigned task.
Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny on February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.
From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.
Illegal armed groups (IAF), using the negotiation process that had begun, redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).
On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.
On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.
On May 12, 1997, a Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded.
The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took the line towards the immediate secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally the population of other North Caucasian republics around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis intensified.
Counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)
In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev’s militants.
Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.
On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) - explosions of residential buildings.
Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct counter-terrorism operations.
On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.
In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new group “Center” was created.
On February 25-27, 2000, units of the “West” blocked Kharsenoy, and the group “East” closed the militants in the area of Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated.
The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelayev’s group in the area of the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After this, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, hostages were taken in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, hostages were taken at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.
By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.
From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
The material was prepared based on information from open sources
Almost four months - from the end of January to the second half of May 1995 - the brigade units spent in “winter quarters”, preparing for new business trips to war in Chechnya.
Back to Chechnya
On May 23, a train with people and equipment from the Shumilovsky explosive brigade began unloading in Khasavyurt. And a week later, an order was given from the commander of the “Vostok” group: to march from Khasavyurt through Gerzel-Aul to Suvorov-Yurt and take positions on the northern outskirts of the village of Novogroznensky.
The tasks set were very serious. However, during the first Chechen war there were no others. Having taken up defensive positions near Novogroznensky, the brigade was supposed to block the main directions of movement of large gangs in the northern direction from the Chechen capital. That is, in essence, to become one of the posts of federal forces in this part of the republic.
It was through the roads and trails of these places that the main flow of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and materiel, and reinforcements from overseas mercenaries, went to the rebels. Many bases and locations of militant detachments were located in the brigade’s area of responsibility. And this meant that major special operations would have to be carried out to block and destroy all this evil spirits, as, indeed, this happened during the second Chechen war.
The daily routine of war
In addition to serious work, what awaited them was what in war is considered, and rightly so, in general, the usual daily routine: escorting and guarding convoys with military supplies and humanitarian aid, serving at checkpoints and roadblocks for inspecting vehicles, reconnaissance, mine clearance roads, assistance to local administration and population.
Where does any military unit begin when it arrives in the specified area? That's right, from the equipment of the place where you are standing. This order is ancient, established by Roman legionnaires. A military camp is both a home and a fortress for soldiers. Arriving at the new PVD, they tore out trenches and shelters for equipment, adapting any terrain fold for defense, be it a ravine, a ditch or a small hill. Moreover, all this had to be done under regular shelling.
Everyday life of the Chechen war
On the day of arrival “at the point of standing,” the militants gave a warm reception. In the full sense of the word: from the hills, densely covered with vegetation, red-green chains of tracer bullets stretched towards the slowly crawling column, and automatic and machine-gun bursts rattled. But due to the great distance, the shooting, although very intense, was not aimed and did not cause any harm to either the equipment or people. Representatives of the local, far from peace-loving population staged all these fireworks for the sole purpose of demonstrating to those who arrived who the real boss was here. But it had the opposite effect: instead of hesitating and retreating back home, the brigade so combed the green stuff from the Zushkas and heavy machine guns of the armored personnel carriers that they immediately discouraged the militants that day from testing our patience and testing our combat readiness.
Confrontation between militants
But it soon became clear that we were opposed by really serious forces of illegal armed groups, who considered themselves the rightful masters of these places. And they do not want to share their power with anyone else. Two days later, the militants decided to repeat the raid on the brigade’s positions.
Simultaneously with the temporary deployment point, “the large base, as we called it, the construction of outposts was underway. One of them, on the nights of May 31 and June 1, 1995, had to fight a protracted battle that lasted several hours. The positions were not yet fully equipped; soldiers and officers held their defenses in half-open trenches. It was hard for them!
Roadside check
The units of the Volga brigade began to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The main one was control of the federal highway in the section from Gerzel-Aul to Gudermes.
There was enough work for everyone, the route was protected in every possible way. Permanent stationary and mobile checkpoints are a given. Behind them, secrets, patrols, and observation posts were placed, which had to be moved to the highway area on the eve of the passage of the columns, sometimes several days in advance. Often the columns themselves included brigade armored groups, ZILs with Zushkas in their bodies. And in the areas most convenient for attack, reinforced reconnaissance and special forces units took up defensive positions ahead of time. And if in those days the news from newspaper pages or television screens did not report attacks by militants and losses of federal troops in the east of Chechnya, this meant only one thing: the soldiers and officers of the brigade of internal troops worked perfectly, calculating the enemy’s actions many moves ahead and making it on time take effective countermeasures.
Meanwhile, the activity and cunning of the militants increased day by day. Or it would be more accurate to say – night after night. And rarely did they take place without shelling or harassing fire.
It was not easy to serve on the roads either. Let's remember: the summer of 1995 was a period of truce, when the world and Russian public, having played with democracy, suddenly became inflamed with love and pity for the militant groups driven into the mountains and almost destroyed. And a stream of humanitarian aid poured into Chechnya from all over the world, under the cover of which (and sometimes instead of it) weapons, military uniforms, and medicines were transported. All this went directly to the militant bases. Therefore, convoys and single heavy vehicles carrying humanitarian aid were inspected especially carefully.
In addition to checks on the roads, the brigade, using its scouts and special forces, carried out several effective ambushes, as a result of which small detachments of militants were captured and destroyed, or, simply put, gangs that were terrorizing people in nearby settlements.
Dry statistics of the war in Chechnya
For four months in a row, the brigade carried out combat missions in Chechnya near Novogroznensky. Here are just a few numbers showing the results of that work.
Dry statistics. But think about it: Behind each line below are sleepless nights, monstrous strain of physical strength and nerves, danger lurking every day:
— On average, the brigade’s military personnel inspected 385 vehicles per day;
Corpses in the back of a truck in Grozny. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Exactly 23 years ago, on December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety in the territory of the Chechen Republic.” On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs) began military operations in Chechnya. Perhaps some participants in the first clashes were mentally prepared for death, but hardly any of them suspected that they would be stuck in this war for almost two years. And then he will come back again.
I would not like to talk about the causes and consequences of the war, about the behavior of the main characters, about the number of losses, about whether it was a civil war or an anti-terrorist operation: hundreds of books have already been written about this. But many photographs certainly need to be shown so that you never forget how disgusting any war is.
Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechens near Grozny. December 1, 1994 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Despite the fact that the Russian army officially began hostilities in December 1994, the first Russian soldiers were captured by the Chechens back in November. 
Photo: AP Photo / Anatoly Maltsev
Dudayev's militants pray against the backdrop of the Presidential Palace in Grozny 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
In January 1995, the palace looked like this: 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Dudayev's militant with a homemade submachine gun in early January 1995. In Chechnya in those years, various types of weapons, including small arms, were collected. 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Destroyed BMP-2 of the Russian army 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Prayer against the backdrop of a fire caused by shrapnel hitting a gas pipe 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Action 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Field commander Shamil Basayev rides on a bus with hostages 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Chechen militants ambushed a convoy of Russian armored vehicles 
Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING
On New Year's Eve 1995, clashes in Grozny were especially brutal. The 131st Maykop Motorized Rifle Brigade lost many soldiers. 
Militants fire back at advancing Russian units. 
Photo: AP PHOTO / PETER DEJONG
Children play in the suburbs of Grozny 
AP PHOTO / EFREM LUKATSKY
Chechen militants in 1995 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev / AFP
Photo: Christopher Morris
Minute Square in Grozny. Evacuation of refugees. 
Gennady Troshev at the stadium. Ordzhonikidze in 1995. The lieutenant general led the Joint Group of Troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, during the Second Chechen War he also commanded Russian troops, then was appointed commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 2008, he died in a Boeing crash in Perm. 
A Russian serviceman plays a piano left in the central park of Grozny. February 6, 1995 
Photo: Reuters
The intersection of Rosa Luxemburg and Tamanskaya streets 
Photo: Christopher Morris
Chechen fighters run for cover 
Photo: Christopher Morris
Grozny, view from the Presidential Palace. March 1995 
Photo: Christopher Morris
A Chechen sniper holed up in a destroyed building takes aim at Russian soldiers. 1996 
Photo: James Nachtwey
Chechen negotiator enters neutral zone 
Photo: James Nachtwey
Children from an orphanage play on a wrecked Russian tank. 1996 
Photo: James Nachtwey
An elderly woman makes her way through the destroyed center of Grozny. 1996 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
Chechen militant holds a machine gun during prayer 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
A wounded soldier in a hospital in Grozny. 1995 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
A woman from the village of Samashki is crying: during an operation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, helicopters or RZSO shot her cows. 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
Russian checkpoint at the Council of Ministers, 1995 
Photo: AP Photo
People left homeless after the bombing of Grozny cook food on a fire in the middle of the street 
Photo: AP Photo/Alexander Zemlanichenko
People fleeing a war zone 
Photo: AP Photo/David Brauchli
The CRI command stated that at the height of the conflict up to 12 thousand soldiers fought for it. Many of them were, in fact, children who went to war after their relatives. 
Photo: AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky
On the left is a wounded man, on the right is a Chechen teenager in military uniform 
Photo: Christopher Morris
By the end of 1995, most of Grozny was ruins 
Photo: AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis
Anti-Russian demonstration in the center of Grozny in February 1996 
Photo: AP Photo
A Chechen with a portrait of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, killed in a rocket attack by federal troops on April 21, 1996 
Photo: AP Photo
Before the 1996 elections, Yeltsin visited Chechnya and, in front of the soldiers, signed a decree reducing the length of military service. 
Photo: AP Photo
Election campaign 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
On August 19, 1996, the commander of the group of Russian troops in Chechnya, Konstantin Pulikovsky, issued an ultimatum to the militants. He invited civilians to leave Grozny within 48 hours. After this period, the assault on the city was supposed to begin, but the military leader was not supported in Moscow, and his plan was thwarted. 
On August 31, 1996, agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, according to which Russia pledged to withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed for 5 and a half years. In the photo, General Lebed, who was then the presidential envoy to Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, the field commander of Chechen militants and the future “president” of the Chechen Republic of Ichnia, are shaking hands. 
Russian soldiers drink champagne in the center of Grozny 
Russian soldiers are preparing to be sent home after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements 
According to human rights activists, up to 35,000 civilians died during the First Chechen War. 
Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING
In Chechnya, the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements was perceived as a victory. In fact, that's what she was. 
Photo: AP Photo/Misha Japaridze
Russian troops left with nothing, losing many soldiers and leaving behind ruins.
In 1999, the Second Chechen War will begin...
25 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the Russian President “On measures to ensure law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” Russian regular army forces entered the territory of Chechnya. The document from the "Caucasian Knot" presents a chronicle of events that preceded the start of the war and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year's" assault on Grozny on December 31, 1994.
The first Chechen war lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1994-1995, a total of about 26 thousand people died in Chechnya, including 2 thousand Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand militants, and the rest of the losses were civilians. According to General A. Lebed's estimates, the number of deaths among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and among federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.
Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control
The turn of the 1980-1990s. in the post-Soviet space was marked by a “parade of sovereignties” - Soviet republics of different levels (both the USSR and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) one after another adopted declarations of state sovereignty. On June 12, 1990, the first Republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin uttered his famous phrase in Ufa: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.”
On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (later transformed into the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty.Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the OKCHN announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.
During the August 1991 putsch, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Council and the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, OKCHN, which was in opposition, opposed the State Emergency Committee and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, a political split occurred in the republic between supporters of the OKCHN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).
On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree “On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.” In response to this, on November 8, 1991, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures for its implementation failed - two planes with special forces landing at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the OKCHN executive committee called for breaking off relations with Russia.
Already in November 1991, supporters of D. Dudayev began seizing military camps, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and internal troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991, D. Dudayev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment of military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving behind a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.
In the fall of 1992, the situation in the region sharply deteriorated again, this time in connection with the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny region. Dzhokhar Dudayev declared the neutrality of Chechnya, but during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudayev declared a state of emergency, and the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.
In February 1993, disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev intensified. The emerging disagreements ultimately led to the dissolution of parliament and the consolidation of opposition political figures in Chechnya around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov grew into an assault on Grozny by the Chechen opposition.
After an unsuccessful assault, the Russian Security Council decided on a military operation against Chechnya. B.N. Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: either the bloodshed in Chechnya stops, or Russia will be forced to “take extreme measures.”
Preparing for war
Active military operations on the territory of Chechnya have been carried out since the end of September 1994. In particular, opposition forces carried out targeted bombing of military targets on the territory of the republic. The armed formations that opposed Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which had no identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the Air Force command and the command of the Army Aviation of the Ground Forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to the Russian army.
On November 30, 1994, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed secret decree No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” which provided for “disarmament and liquidation of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
According to the text of the decree, from December 1 it was prescribed, in particular, “to implement measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the Chechen Republic,” to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed groups, and to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.
On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev stated that “an operation has begun to forcefully transfer Russian army officers fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition to the central regions of Russia.” On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Russian Minister of Defense and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on the “immunity of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya.”
On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation was held regarding the Chechen events. At the meeting, a resolution was adopted “On the situation in the Chechen Republic and measures for its political settlement,” according to which the activities of the executive branch in resolving the conflict were recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to B.N. Yeltsin, in which they warned him of responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” By this decree, the president instructed the Russian government to “use all means available to the state to ensure state security, legality, the rights and freedoms of citizens, protect public order, fight crime, and disarm all illegal armed groups.” On the same day, the government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360 “On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus,” which entrusted a number of ministries and departments with duties to introduce and maintain a special regime similar to an emergency on the territory of Chechnya, without formally declaring a state of emergency or martial law.
The documents adopted on December 9 provided for the use of troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were supposed to begin on December 12 in Vladikavkaz.
Beginning of a full-scale military campaign
On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” repealing decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the president addressed the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he stated: “Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - the Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism.”
On the day the decree was signed, units of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through areas of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).
On the same day, December 11, an anti-war rally was held in Moscow, organized by the Russia's Choice party. Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky demanded to stop the movement of troops and announced a break with the policies of Boris Yeltsin. A few days later the communists also spoke out against the war.
Troops moving from the north passed unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located approximately 10 km north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired at from a Grad launcher by a detachment of field commander Vakha Arsanov. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian soldiers were killed and 12 wounded, and more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The Grad installation was destroyed by return fire.
On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, Russian troops stopped and installed fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of shelling of populated areas by Russian troops, numerous casualties occurred among civilians.
Another column of Russian troops moving from Dagestan was stopped on December 11 even before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt region, where mainly Akkin Chechens live. Crowds of local residents blocked the columns of troops, while individual groups of military personnel were captured and then transported to Grozny.
A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired upon near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three armored personnel carriers and four cars were damaged. As a result of the return fire, the first civilian casualties occurred. The Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt was shelled from helicopters. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this column of federal troops was fired upon from the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. There were killed and wounded among the Russian military personnel; in response, fire was also opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoy, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. Further advance of Russian troops would lead to the need to shoot at unarmed people, and then to clashes with a militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These units were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. In the area located south of the village of Bamut, regular armed formations of the ChRI, which had heavy weapons, were based.
As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces consolidated along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - New Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.
On December 15, 1994, against the backdrop of the first setbacks in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire “before the start of a major military operation that could entail large casualties among civilians.” population", receive a written order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General A. Mityukhin.
On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it invited the President of the Russian Federation to immediately stop hostilities and the deployment of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his forces.
On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudayev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister of Nationalities and Regional Policy N.D. Egorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign a document about the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, read verbatim: “I suggest you immediately meet with my authorized representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok.” At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2200 “On the restoration of federal territorial executive authorities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
Siege and assault of Grozny
Starting from December 18, Grozny was bombed and bombed multiple times. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on areas where residential buildings were located and there were obviously no military installations. As a result, there were large casualties among the civilian population. Despite the Russian President's announcement on December 27 that the bombing of the city had ceased, air strikes continued to strike Grozny.
In the second half of December, Russian federal troops attacked Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions practically unblocked. The remaining open corridors connecting Grozny and numerous villages of Chechnya with the outside world allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.
On the night of December 23, federal troops attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and gained a foothold in the area of the airport in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.
On December 26, bombing of populated areas in rural areas began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were hit.
On December 26, it was announced for the second time about the creation of a government of national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and enter into negotiations with it, without putting forward demands for the withdrawal of troops.
On the same day, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, a decision was made to send troops to Grozny. Before this, no specific plans were developed to capture the capital of Chechnya.
On December 27, B.N. Yeltsin made a televised address to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a forceful solution to the Chechen problem. B.N. Yeltsin stated that N.D. Egorov, A.V. Kvashnin and S.V. Stepashin were entrusted with conducting negotiations with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that this is not about negotiations, but about presenting an ultimatum.
On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian army units began. It was planned that four groups would launch “powerful concentric attacks” and unite in the city center. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment, advancing from the northwestern direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, were almost completely destroyed. More than 100 military personnel were captured.
As stated by deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L. Sheinis stated that “a large-scale military action was unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and artillery shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke through to the city center. The armored columns were cut into pieces by the defenders of Grozny and began to be systematically destroyed. Their crews were killed, captured or scattered throughout the city. The troops that entered the city suffered a crushing defeat."
The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year's offensive on Grozny.
On January 2, 1995, the press service of the Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital was “completely controlled by federal troops” and the “presidential palace” was blocked.
The war in Chechnya lasted until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist attacks outside Chechnya (Budennovsk, Kizlyar). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed and Chief of Staff of Chechen militants Aslan Maskhadov. As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on “deferred status” (the issue of the status of Chechnya was supposed to be resolved before December 31, 2001). Chechnya became a de facto independent state.
Notes
- Chechnya: ancient turmoil // Izvestia, 11/27/1995.
- How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
- The assault that never happened // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
- Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic."
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict."
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- 1994: War in Chechnya // Obshchaya Gazeta, 12/18.04.2001.
- 20 years of the Chechen war // Gazeta.ru, 12/11/2014.
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Grozny: bloody snow of New Year's Eve // Independent Military Review, 12/10/2004.
- Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
- Signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 08/31/2011.
There are many wars written into the history of Russia. Most of them were liberation, some began on our territory and ended far beyond its borders. But there is nothing worse than such wars, which were started as a result of the illiterate actions of the country’s leadership and led to terrifying results because the authorities solved their own problems without paying attention to the people.
One of such sad pages of Russian history is the Chechen war. This was not a confrontation between two different peoples. There were no absolute rights in this war. And the most surprising thing is that this war still cannot be considered over.
Prerequisites for the start of the war in Chechnya
It is hardly possible to talk about these military campaigns briefly. The era of perestroika, so pompously announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, marked the collapse of a huge country consisting of 15 republics. However, the main difficulty for Russia was that, left without satellites, it was faced with internal unrest that had a nationalistic character. The Caucasus turned out to be especially problematic in this regard.
Back in 1990, the National Congress was created. This organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former major general of aviation in the Soviet Army. The Congress set its main goal to secede from the USSR; in the future, it was planned to create a Chechen Republic, independent of any state.
In the summer of 1991, a situation of dual power arose in Chechnya, since both the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by Dudayev, acted.
This state of affairs could not exist for long, and in September the same Dzhokhar and his supporters seized the republican television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. This was the beginning of the revolution. The situation was extremely precarious, and its development was facilitated by the official collapse of the country carried out by Yeltsin. Following the news that the Soviet Union no longer existed, Dudayev's supporters announced that Chechnya was seceding from Russia.
The separatists seized power - under their influence, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic on October 27, as a result of which power was completely in the hands of ex-General Dudayev. And a few days later, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree stating that a state of emergency was being introduced in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In fact, this document became one of the reasons for the start of the bloody Chechen wars.
At that time, there was quite a lot of ammunition and weapons in the republic. Some of these reserves had already been captured by the separatists. Instead of blocking the situation, the Russian leadership allowed it to get even more out of control - in 1992, the head of the Ministry of Defense Grachev transferred half of all these reserves to the militants. The authorities explained this decision by saying that it was no longer possible to remove weapons from the republic at that time.
However, during this period there was still an opportunity to stop the conflict. An opposition was created that opposed Dudayev's power. However, after it became clear that these small detachments could not resist the militant formations, the war was practically already underway.
Yeltsin and his political supporters could no longer do anything, and from 1991 to 1994 it was actually a republic independent of Russia. It had its own government bodies and had its own state symbols. In 1994, when Russian troops were brought into the territory of the republic, a full-scale war began. Even after the resistance of Dudayev’s militants was suppressed, the problem was never completely resolved.
Speaking about the war in Chechnya, it is worth considering that the fault for its outbreak, first of all, was the illiterate leadership of first the USSR and then Russia. It was the weakening of the internal political situation in the country that led to the weakening of the outskirts and the strengthening of nationalist elements.
As for the essence of the Chechen war, there is a conflict of interests and an inability to govern a vast territory on the part of first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. Subsequently, it was up to the people who came to power at the very end of the twentieth century to untie this tangled knot.
First Chechen war 1994-1996
Historians, writers and filmmakers are still trying to assess the scale of the horrors of the Chechen war. No one denies that it caused enormous damage not only to the republic itself, but to all of Russia. However, it is worth considering that the nature of the two campaigns was quite different.
During the Yeltsin era, when the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996 was launched, Russian troops could not act coherently and freely enough. The country's leadership solved its problems, moreover, according to some information, many people profited from this war - weapons were supplied to the territory of the republic from the Russian Federation, and militants often made money by demanding large ransoms for hostages.
At the same time, the main task of the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009 was the suppression of gangs and the establishment of constitutional order. It is clear that if the goals of both campaigns were different, then the course of action was significantly different.
On December 1, 1994, airstrikes were carried out on airfields located in Khankala and Kalinovskaya. And already on December 11, Russian units were introduced into the territory of the republic. This fact marked the beginning of the First Campaign. Entry was carried out from three directions at once - through Mozdok, through Ingushetia and through Dagestan.
By the way, at that time the Ground Forces were led by Eduard Vorobiev, but he immediately resigned, considering it unwise to lead the operation, since the troops were completely unprepared for conducting full-scale combat operations.
At first, Russian troops advanced quite successfully. The entire northern territory was occupied by them quickly and without much loss. From December 1994 to March 1995, the Russian Armed Forces stormed Grozny. The city was built up quite densely, and Russian units were simply stuck in skirmishes and attempts to take the capital.
Russian Defense Minister Grachev expected to take the city very quickly and therefore did not spare human and technical resources. According to researchers, more than 1,500 Russian soldiers and many civilians of the republic died or went missing near Grozny. The armored vehicles also suffered serious damage - almost 150 units were damaged.
However, after two months of fierce fighting, federal troops finally took Grozny. Participants in the hostilities subsequently recalled that the city was destroyed almost to the ground, and this is confirmed by numerous photographs and video documents.
During the assault, not only armored vehicles were used, but also aviation and artillery. There were bloody battles on almost every street. The militants lost more than 7,000 people during the operation in Grozny and, under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, on March 6 they were forced to finally leave the city, which came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces.
However, the war, which brought death to thousands of not only armed but also civilians, did not end there. The fighting continued first on the plains (from March to April), and then in the mountainous regions of the republic (from May to June 1995). Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were taken successively.
The militants responded with terrorist attacks carried out in Budennovsk and Kizlyar. After varying successes on both sides, a decision was made to negotiate. And as a result, on August 31, 1996, agreements were concluded. According to them, federal troops were leaving Chechnya, the republic's infrastructure was to be restored, and the question of independent status was postponed.
Second Chechen campaign 1999–2009
If the country's authorities hoped that by reaching an agreement with the militants, they would solve the problem and the battles of the Chechen war would become a thing of the past, then everything turned out to be wrong. Over several years of a dubious truce, the gangs have only accumulated strength. In addition, more and more Islamists from Arab countries entered the territory of the republic.
As a result, on August 7, 1999, the militants of Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan. Their calculation was based on the fact that the Russian government at that time looked very weak. Yeltsin practically did not lead the country, the Russian economy was in deep decline. The militants hoped that they would take their side, but they put up serious resistance to the bandit groups.
The reluctance to allow Islamists into their territory and the help of federal troops forced the Islamists to retreat. True, this took a month - the militants were driven out only in September 1999. At that time, Chechnya was led by Aslan Maskhadov, and, unfortunately, he was not able to exercise full control over the republic.
It was at this time, angry that they failed to break Dagestan, that Islamist groups began carrying out terrorist attacks on Russian territory. Horrible terrorist attacks were committed in Volgodonsk, Moscow and Buynaksk, which claimed dozens of lives. Therefore, the number of those killed in the Chechen war must include those civilians who never thought that it would come to their families.
In September 1999, a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was issued, signed by Yeltsin. And on December 31, he announced his resignation from the presidency.
As a result of the presidential elections, power in the country passed to a new leader, Vladimir Putin, whose tactical abilities the militants did not take into account. But at that time, Russian troops were already on the territory of Chechnya, again bombed Grozny and acted much more competently. The experience of the previous campaign was taken into account.
December 1999 is another painful and terrible chapter of the war. The Argun Gorge was otherwise called “Wolf Gate” - one of the largest Caucasian gorges. Here, the landing and border troops carried out the special operation "Argun", the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Russian-Georgian border from Khattab's troops, and also to deprive the militants of the weapons supply route from the Pankisi Gorge. The operation was completed in February 2000.
Many people also remember the feat of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. These fighters became real heroes of the Chechen war. They withstood a terrible battle on the 776th height, when they, numbering only 90 people, managed to hold back over 2,000 militants for 24 hours. Most of the paratroopers died, and the militants themselves lost almost a quarter of their strength.
Despite such cases, the second war, unlike the first, can be called sluggish. Perhaps that is why it lasted longer - a lot happened over the years of these battles. The new Russian authorities decided to act differently. They refused to conduct active combat operations carried out by federal troops. It was decided to exploit the internal split in Chechnya itself. Thus, Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov went over to the side of the federals, and situations were increasingly observed when ordinary militants laid down their arms.
Putin, realizing that such a war could last indefinitely, decided to take advantage of internal political fluctuations and persuade the authorities to cooperate. Now we can say that he succeeded. It also played a role that on May 9, 2004, Islamists carried out a terrorist attack in Grozny, aimed at intimidating the population. An explosion occurred at the Dynamo stadium during a concert dedicated to Victory Day. More than 50 people were injured, and Akhmat Kadyrov died from his injuries.
This odious terrorist attack brought completely different results. The population of the republic was finally disappointed in the militants and rallied around the legitimate government. A young man was appointed to replace his father, who understood the futility of the Islamist resistance. Thus, the situation began to change for the better. If the militants relied on attracting foreign mercenaries from abroad, the Kremlin decided to use national interests. The residents of Chechnya were very tired of the war, so they already voluntarily went over to the side of the pro-Russian forces.
The counterterrorism operation regime, introduced by Yeltsin on September 23, 1999, was abolished by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Thus, the campaign was officially over, since it was not called a war, but a CTO. However, can we assume that veterans of the Chechen war can sleep peacefully if local battles are still taking place and terrorist acts are carried out from time to time?
Results and consequences for the history of Russia
It is unlikely that anyone today can specifically answer the question of how many died in the Chechen war. The problem is that any calculations will only be approximate. During the period of intensification of the conflict before the First Campaign, many people of Slavic origin were repressed or forced to leave the republic. During the years of the First Campaign, many fighters from both sides died, and these losses also cannot be accurately calculated.
While military losses can still be more or less calculated, no one has been involved in ascertaining losses among the civilian population, except perhaps human rights activists. Thus, according to the current official data, the 1st war claimed the following number of lives:
- Russian soldiers - 14,000 people;
- militants - 3,800 people;
- civilian population - from 30,000 to 40,000 people.
If we talk about the Second Campaign, the results of the death toll are as follows:
- federal troops - about 3,000 people;
- militants - from 13,000 to 15,000 people;
- civilian population - 1000 people.
It should be borne in mind that these figures vary greatly depending on which organizations provide them. For example, when discussing the results of the second Chechen war, official Russian sources talk about a thousand civilian deaths. At the same time, Amnesty International (an international non-governmental organization) gives completely different figures - about 25,000 people. The difference in these data, as you can see, is huge.
The result of the war is not only the impressive numbers of casualties among killed, wounded, and missing people. This is also a destroyed republic - after all, many cities, primarily Grozny, were subjected to artillery shelling and bombing. Their entire infrastructure was practically destroyed, so Russia had to rebuild the capital of the republic from scratch.
As a result, today Grozny is one of the most beautiful and modern cities. Other settlements of the republic were also rebuilt.
Anyone interested in this information can find out what happened in the territory from 1994 to 2009. There are many films about the Chechen war, books and various materials on the Internet.
However, those who were forced to leave the republic, lost their relatives, their health - these people hardly want to immerse themselves again in what they have already experienced. The country was able to withstand this most difficult period of its history, and once again proved that dubious calls for independence or unity with Russia are more important for them.
The history of the Chechen war has not yet been fully studied. Researchers will spend a long time looking for documents about losses among military and civilians and rechecking statistical data. But today we can say: the weakening of the top and the desire for disunity always lead to dire consequences. Only the strengthening of state power and the unity of people can end any confrontation so that the country can live in peace again.
