The first Soviet atomic bomb, tested at training site No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (Semipalatinsk test site) on August 29, 1949, was designed by KB-11 (now the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - VNIIEF, Sarov) and manufactured jointly with plant No.-817 under the scientific leadership of I.V. Kurchatov and Yu.B. Khariton according to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the technical specifications of Yu.B. Khariton.
Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov
employees of KB-11 VNIIEF, Sarov
RDS-1 was an aircraft atomic bomb weighing 4700 kg, with a diameter of 1500 mm and a length of 3300 mm. It used plutonium as fissile material.
In the process of preparing for the testing of an atomic bomb, an exceptionally large amount of work had to be completed not only on the development, but also on the creation of a nuclear test site, its arrangement, scientific, methodological and instrumentation support for the experiment.
The final stage can be divided into three main stages:
The first is the preparation stage carried out in KB-11 in the period from April to July 1949;
- the second - carried out at the training ground in the third ten days of July - until August 26, 1949;
- the third stage - the final operations, which began on August 27, and the experiment itself.
The beginning of the final stage of preparation for the test site can be taken as April 11, 1949 - the date of publication of the order of the head of the facility (KB-11 -VNIIEF) P.M. Zernov to provide work related to the upcoming field tests.
In accordance with the order, a special group of seven people was created to manage all preparations for testing, headed by Deputy Chief Designer, Professor K.I. Shchelkin. The group was entrusted with developing a general program of work at the test site, conducting training experiments, developing various instructions and schedules, and carrying out operational monitoring of the progress of preparations for testing by the institute's divisions.
The first atomic bomb of the USSR RDS-1
schematic diagram of RDS-1
The preparation of RDS-1 for testing was under the constant control of the administration, the scientific and technical leadership of KB-11 and the Soviet government. So, already in April 1949, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria was presented with two reports on the state of work on the development of the atomic bomb and its preparation for testing. The reports stated that by April 1949, all fundamental theoretical, design and technological issues had been resolved. In particular, the following was noted.
Under the leadership of Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ya.B. Zepedovich, a general theory of charge operation was constructed and the necessary calculations were carried out.
Yakov Borisovich Zeldovich
Large forces from the Mathematical Institute of the Academy of Sciences and its Leningrad branch were involved in the numerical solution of differential and integral equations. Based on the general theory of the product, as well as technological and operational considerations, the main design dimensions of the nuclear charge were determined. The design of the neutron fuse (N3) and the technology for its manufacture have been developed; the design of a composite charge of explosives has been developed, ensuring the creation of a converging detonation wave.
Charge RDS-1
The processes of detonation of explosives and composite charges have been studied in detail, and the properties of materials used in the construction of atomic charges at ultra-high pressures have been studied. The production of explosive charges with stable characteristics has been established.
A synchronous ignition system has been developed that ensures simultaneous firing of detonator capsules (DC).
The ballistics of the atomic bomb was worked out jointly with the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (Academician S.A. Khristianovich).
The product's automation has been developed to ensure reliable operation and safe operation. The performance of the entire RDS-1 product without a plutonium charge was confirmed experimentally when dropped from an aircraft at the 71st Air Force training ground.
The reports noted that in order to complete the development and manufacture of the first atomic bomb, it is necessary to conduct state tests of five RDS-1 mock-ups at 71 test sites, produce the required amount of plutonium and material for the NS, and produce a plutonium charge and NS. The result of the work should be the testing of an atomic bomb at the Semipalatinsk test site (training site No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR).
photo from space
In the reports of the chief designer Yu.B. Khariton and his deputy K.I. Shchelkin dated April 15, 1949 contained a proposal to appoint a commission to review and approve the program of training experiments at training ground No. 2. Attached to the report was a document defining the procedure for testing the RDS-1 at this training ground.
In the process of preparing for the experiment, a special role was given to practicing the actions of personnel in conditions that were as close as possible to testing grounds. For this purpose, in May - early July 1949, groups of direct performers of work and responsible managers were formed in KB-11, the sequence of operations and methods for their implementation were determined and reflected in work instructions or technological maps, four training detonations of products without plutonium charges were carried out at internal test site KB-11, during which the technology of the experiment was refined.
The technology for preparing the experiment included the following work:
Assembly of a charge from an explosive, delivered to the test site in disassembled form, in an assembly building located on a site 10 km from the center of the field;
Delivery of the collected explosive charge to the workshop near a metal tower installed in the center of the experimental field. A.Ya. was appointed responsible for assembling the charge. Malsky - director of plant No. 2 at KB-11 for the production of parts from explosives;
Installation of an ignition system for electric detonators under the leadership of Deputy Chief Designer V.I. Apferov;
Assembly of a plutonium charge with a neutron fuse under the leadership of Deputy Chief Designer N.L. Dukhov;
Placement of the central part into the charge and its final assembly of the latter under the leadership of A. Ya. Malsky, N. L. Dukhov and V. I. Alferov;
Transfer of the product to a group of demolitions led by K.I. Shchelkin and deputy head of the laboratory S.N. Matveev;
Lifting the product onto the tower, equipping it with detonator caps, connecting to the blasting circuit;
Detonation of the product.
The specified sequence of work and distribution of responsibilities between senior KB-11 employees were retained until combat experience.
Those responsible for carrying out the final operations were required by the program to accept in KB-11 the units and parts necessary for these works, to be responsible for their delivery to the test site, storage and assembly at the testing point until the delivery of their work to the Government Commission.
During the period from July 4 to July 6, 1949, B.L. Vannikov and I.V. Kurchatov, together with the management of KB-11, reviewed issues related to theoretical calculations, design, experimental and technological development of the RDS-1, the procedure for sending it to the test site, conducting training and combat experiments.
In the report of B.L. Vannikov and I.V. Kurchatov on the progress of preparations for testing the first atomic bomb, sent to Beria, stated the completeness of the development of the RDS-1 and the validity of the technical characteristics of the product.
At the same time, it was pointed out that it was necessary to complete experiments to measure nuclear constants, based on the results of which, by August 1, it was necessary to determine the final dimensions and mass of the plutonium charge, as well as to develop a duplicate technology for preparing the experiment, providing for the installation of plutonium parts in an explosive charge delivered to the test site in the assembled state. form.
The procedure for installing the RDS-1 at the test site was approved after its testing in a specially equipped room KB-11, where the assembly stands, the tower's lifting cage, access roads to it and lifting and transport structures located near the tower at the test site were reproduced in full size. The same document ordered two training and five combat sets of explosive charges to be sent to the test site. The decision to send five combat sets of explosive charges with one plutonium charge was made in order to insure against unforeseen accidents that could lead to damage to explosive charges during transportation, storage and work at the test site.
By decision of B.L. Vannikov and I.V. Kurchatov, responsibility for organizing the work to prepare RDS-1 for testing was assigned to Yu.B. Khariton, and direct supervision of the assembly of the product and its detonation at the test site - to K.I. Shchepkina.
Yu.B. Khariton was given quite broad powers, in particular, he was given the right to individually decide on the removal from testing of any instruments and devices of the test site that could in some way damage or interfere with the detonation of RDS-1. It is not known whether Yuliy Borisovich had to take full advantage of his rights, but the fact is that after a general check of the readiness of the experimental field by a commission with the participation of Yu.B. Khariton, it was decided that it was inadmissible to establish a new technique for measuring the time interval between the moment the explosive detonation pulse was given and the moment the nuclear reaction began - an authentic fact.
Yuliy Borisovich Khariton with RDS-1
One of the main issues in the creation of an atomic bomb was the question of choosing the size and mass of the plutonium charge, ensuring the required value of the coefficient of performance (efficiency), power and reducing the likelihood of an incomplete explosion.
Based on detailed calculations, the group of Academician L.D. By June 1949, Landau issued a series of efficiency values for several typical values of the masses and sizes of a plutonium charge, and by the end of June the final interpolation formula for calculating the efficiency.
The preliminary mass and dimensions of the plutonium charge were determined at a meeting in KB-11 with the participation of B.L. Vannnkova and I.V. Kurchatov, held on June 8. The meeting participants, having discussed the results of theoretical calculations, agreed with the characteristics of the plutonium charge proposed by the developers, intended for the first test.
By July, plant No. 817 had produced a set of parts for a plutonium charge. To carry out physical measurements, a group of physicists went to the plant under the leadership of the head of the laboratory, Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences G.N. Flerov, and to process the results of these measurements, calculate the efficiency values and the probability of an incomplete explosion - a group of theorists led by Ya.B. Zeldovich. At the end of July, I.V. arrived at the plant to receive the first plutonium charge. Kurchatov, B.L. Vannikov, A.L. Zavenyagin and Yu.B. Khariton.
Here, on July 27, 1949, a meeting was held to decide on the final dimensions of the first plutonium product.
The meeting was attended by B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, B.G. Muzrukov, Yu.B. Khariton, Ya.B. Zepedovich, G.N. Flerov, D.A. Frank-Kamenetsky.
Yu.B. made a proposal on the final dimensions of the main charge and the procedure for their fine-tuning. Khariton and Ya.B. Zeldovich. The meeting participants agreed with the proposed mass and size of the plutonium charge and the expected characteristics of RDS-1: a power of approximately 10,000 tons.
August 2 I.V. Kurchatov, Yu.B. Khariton, Ya.B. Zeldovich and G.N. Flerov signed an act confirming the suitability of the finally manufactured plutonium charge, and on August 5, 1949, at plant No. 817 E.P. Slavsky, I.V. Kurchatov, A.A. Bochvar and others signed technical passports with a conclusion on the suitability of the parts of the first plutonium charge. These passports are still stored in the VNIIEF archive.
Already on August 8, plutonium parts were delivered to KB-11, carefully examined and prepared for the “control assembly of RDS-1, which was carried out on the night of August 10-11. The plutonium charge was installed in an explosive charge. After installing the central unit, the final assembly of the charge was carried out using standard technology.
During the control assembly, measurements of neutron and gamma radiation were continuously carried out. The measurements carried out confirmed the calculated parameters of the rate of increase in the neutron multiplication factor and its numerical value. In general, the control assembly confirmed the correctness of the calculations, the maturity of the technology for assembling the atomic charge, its full compliance with the technical requirements and its suitability for nuclear testing.
The parts of the plutonium charge, after being removed from the explosive charge, were inspected, packaged and prepared for shipment to the test site. These were one of the last operations carried out at KB-11 to prepare the first atomic bomb for testing.
In June - July 1949, two groups of KB-11 workers with auxiliary equipment and household supplies were sent to the test site, and on July 24 a group of specialists led by P.M. arrived there. Zernov, who was supposed to be directly involved in preparing the atomic bomb for testing. On July 26, the entire composition of the government commission, chaired by M.G., gathered at the training ground. Pervukhin, which included P.M. Zernov, K.I. Shchelkin and A. Sverdlov.
The development of a nuclear charge was completed, and the first stage of the final stage of preparation for testing the first atomic bomb was completed. A serious exam lay ahead - field testing.
There was about a month left before the atomic bomb test. The center of all preparation moved to the test site, where intensive work was carried out to complete the construction of structures intended for assembling the product, making physical measurements and placing test objects.
What was the testing ground like?
The location for training ground No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces was chosen near the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR, in a waterless steppe with rare abandoned and dry wells, salt lakes, and partially covered with low mountains.
The site itself, intended for the construction of the test complex, was a plain with a diameter of approximately 30 km, surrounded from the south, west and north by low (up to 200 m) mountains - a wonderful place, as if nature itself had taken care to create maximum convenience for the upcoming tests.
The headquarters of the military unit, which is the owner of the future test site, together with a residential town, with a scientific and material base, is located on the banks of the Irtysh River, 60 km northeast of the test site, 120 km from Semipalatinsk.
monument to I.V. Kurchatov in front of the headquarters of training ground No. 2
The territory within a radius of 100 km around the selected center of the test field, used only by Kazakh nomads for grazing livestock, had no permanent settlements, and after the creation of the test site was alienated. For Kazakh nomads, about 20 km from the military town downstream of the Irtysh, a village of prefabricated panel houses was built near the ancient Kazakh settlement of Akzhary. However, these houses did not correspond to the everyday traditions of the nomads and did not last long - they were destroyed and burned.
On the territory of the military unit's deployment on the banks of the Irtysh, a military unit command headquarters building, an officers' house, a two-story hotel for seconded people, two 8-apartment houses were built - one for the command staff of the military unit, the other a hotel for seconded members of the commission. Right there, next to the headquarters, there were two-story military trade buildings - manufactured goods and food stores. Several blocks of two-story 8- and 12-apartment residential buildings for officers of the military unit were built nearby.
Construction of the test site began in 1947 and was largely completed by July 1949. In just two years, a colossal amount of work was completed, with excellent quality and at a very high technical level. To this it must also be added that all construction materials, from sand and gravel to metal structures, were delivered to construction sites by road along dirt roads 100-200 km away. The movement went on around the clock both in winter and summer. On the highways, points were set up every 25 km where a tired driver could rest, warm up, or call technical or medical assistance by telephone in case of unforeseen circumstances.
All construction soldiers, from ordinary soldiers to colonels, had extensive experience acquired on the fronts of the Patriotic War. Soldiers and officers who were subject to demobilization, but detained for long-term service for the construction of training ground facilities, worked here.
The construction of numerous above-ground and underground instrument structures, buildings, workshops and other objects on the experimental field, as well as the construction of structures and buildings on sites “N”, “Sh”, “O” and “M” was carried out by military construction units of the Ministry of the Armed Forces. They were led by Lieutenant General of the Engineering Service Timofeev - an exceptionally competent specialist with excellent knowledge of military engineering, a talented organizer, a wonderful person, an intellectual who had experience in military engineering since the time of the Tsarist army.
To test an atomic bomb at the test site, the following were prepared:
An experimental field with a radius of 10 km, equipped with special structures that ensure testing, observation and recording of physical measurements;
Site "N", located on the eastern border of the experimental field, with buildings and structures intended for assembling the product before testing, storing components and parts of the atomic bomb, apparatus and equipment;
The headquarters town (site "Ш"), located approximately 5 km from the border of the experimental field, on its northeastern radius and intended to house the headquarters of the security forces and power supply of the experimental field;
Residential town (site "M", now the city of Kurchatov), located 60 km in the north-eastern direction of the experimental field and approximately 130 km west of the city of Semipalatinsk, downstream of the Irtysh River;
The laboratory town is one and a half kilometers from the residential town.
All objects, with the exception of the experimental field, did not represent anything unusual. The experimental field was impressive in its size and abundance of structures with measuring equipment, equipment, civil and industrial facilities built to study the effects of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.
A metal lattice tower “1 - P”, 37.5 m high, was mounted in the center of the experimental field to install the RDS-1 test product. The tower is equipped with an electrically controlled cargo and passenger lift.
25 m from the tower there was a building made of reinforced concrete structures, with an overhead crane in the hall for installing a plutonium charge into an explosive charge.
The experimental field is conventionally divided into 14 sectors. Among them: two fortification sectors; civil engineering and construction sector; physical sector; military sectors, in which samples of weapons and military equipment of all branches of the military were located at various distances from the center, openly and in shelters of various types; biological sector.
A section of highway with a reinforced concrete bridge with a span of 8-10 m was built 1500 m from the center in a western direction. The roadbed was raised onto an embankment 3-4 m high. Trucks were installed on the roadbed.
A section of railway with a metal bridge with a span of 20 m was built 1000 m from the center in the south-west direction. A freight car and a fuel tank were installed on the tracks on the bridge and in front of the bridge.
Two three-story houses were built 800 m from the center in a southern direction, one of which shielded the other. The distance between houses corresponds to the width of a normal city street (approximately 20 m).
A power station building with two diesel generators was built 1500 m from the center in the south-east direction, and a 2 km long power line was built on metal supports towards the center.
A brick and concrete industrial building of simplified design with an overhead crane was built 1500 m from the center in a northern direction.
Instrument buildings were built along radii in the northeastern and southeastern directions at various distances from the center to house photochronographic, film and oscillographic equipment that records the effect of a nuclear explosion.
At a distance of approximately 1000 m from the center in the eastern direction, an underground building 1 OP was constructed, which houses equipment that records light, neutron and gamma fluxes of a nuclear explosion from sensors located on the daylight surface at various distances from the center of the explosion.
Optical and oscillographic equipment installed at all measuring points (structures) is controlled via cables from a program machine located in building 12P. The charge detonation control cable line at a distance of 3 km from the center has a switch disconnector located in a reinforced concrete PP bunker. A dugout was built 7 km from the center in a south-eastern direction to carry out training explosions of charges. Sections of metro tunnels with various reinforcement structures were built 200-300 m from the center at depths of 15-30 m. At various distances from the center, sections of airfield runways were constructed from reinforced concrete and metal panels.
To study the impact of the shock wave and light radiation of a nuclear explosion on military equipment, many aircraft of various designs and purposes, tanks, artillery rocket launchers, ship superstructures, ammunition, etc. were placed throughout the field.
Military equipment was installed at various distances from the center of the explosion with various orientations to the center of the explosion, in caponier-type shelters and in open areas. At a distance of approximately 9 km from the center, two Pe-2 aircraft are installed, one as if on takeoff, the second on a steep turn.
At a distance of 500-2500 m, fortifications were built: trenches with log and brush covering steep slopes, dugouts, bunkers, etc.
Experimental animals were placed in armored vehicles, shelters and open areas at various distances from the center: dogs, sheep, pigs, rats, mice and even two camels.
At the locations of the equipment and experimental animals, the values of light, neutron and gamma fluxes and the amplitude of the shock wave were measured.
High-speed and normal film equipment filmed the development of the explosion, the formation and development of the gas cloud, from various distances from the center of the explosion and the impact of the shock wave on structures and military equipment.
Thus, the experimental field is equipped with a wide variety of means for determining the impact of the parameters of a nuclear explosion on equipment, above-ground and underground structures for various economic and military purposes, and on animals. Equipped with instruments designed to record the parameters of a nuclear explosion: shock wave, light radiation, neutron and gamma flux.
In addition, in order to study the effect of penetrating radiation on food products, NZ sets were placed in an open field at various distances from the center of the explosion: canned food, sausages, chocolate, drinks, etc.
This entire huge farm - equipment, animals, measuring systems, automated control systems for these complexes - required qualified service and in very large volumes. For this purpose, a large number of military officers and enlisted personnel were recruited, most of whom had engineering experience during the Patriotic War. To transport weapons, equipment and property of other branches of the military, 90 railway cars were needed.
The physical sector was of greatest interest. In it, on two duplicate north-eastern and south-eastern directions, the following were built: 15 reinforced concrete towers 20 m high; 2 metal towers of the same height; 17 small reinforced concrete towers 3 m high; 2 underground casemates; 2 automatic control panels for devices, a command post with a programmable machine.
In total, to support the tasks of the physical sector, 44 structures were built at the test site and a cable network with a length of 560 km was laid.
Equipment designed to measure parameters characterizing the operation of the product and the damaging factors of the explosion was placed in the structures and on the surface of the earth.
Now we know that the Semipalatinsk test site was built in just two years by 15 thousand builders and cost the country, devastated and hungry after the Great Patriotic War, a huge amount for those times - about 180 million rubles, not counting the costs of all other preparations for the test.
The government commission chaired by M.G. Pervukhina started work on July 27. Until August 5, the commission held 9 meetings at which specific issues related to the preparation for testing of all services and facilities of the test site were discussed. In the commission’s act dated August 5, it was concluded that the test site was fully ready by August 10 and proposed that the management of the test site and KB-11 carry out a detailed training of the operations for assembling and detonating the product, as well as the interaction of all services of the test site and KB-11, within 15 days. The test date loomed - the last days of August.
I.V. was appointed head of the test of the first nuclear charge RDS-1. Kurchatov. On the part of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the general management of the preparation of the test site was carried out by Major General V.A. It hurts. MA was appointed scientific director of the test site. Sadovsky.
Viktor Anisimovich Bolyatko
The operational dispatch service monitored the compliance of the work progress with the operational plan. Control over the preparation of the automatic charge detonation control was carried out by Colonel N.P. Egorov and Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Savin. Highly qualified engineers who were well versed in all the intricacies of our technology, they provided great assistance in the quality preparation of the automation system and helped to avoid incorrect actions.
In accordance with the conclusion of the commission, in the period from August 10 to 26, 10 rehearsals of the joint operation of the field control and the product remote control with a cable line were carried out, as well as three training recordings with the launch of all equipment. During these exercises, the full cycle of RDS-1 training was practiced, including the assembly of a ball charge, with the exception of the installation of plutonium, lifting it and the automatic detonation onto the loading platform of the tower "1-P", located at a 30-meter height, a control check of the line and automatic detonation, equipping the product with detonator caps and detonating it.
The first experiment (control) was carried out with an inert product. It focused on securing the charge in the lift cage and on the loading platform of the tower, and on checking the functionality of the automatic detonation and field. A feature of the second control experiment was the use of an explosive charge transported from KB-11 to the test site by train in assembled form.
In the third general control experiment, the explosive charge, as well as the charge intended for combat detonation, was assembled at the test site. All units involved in the tests took part in this experiment.
In the last two control experiments, after work on the 1-P tower, the charges were lowered down, transported to a remote platform, installed there on a stand 3.5 m high and detonated by the automatic detonation system.
The training exercises confirmed the good quality of charge assembly, the reliability of the automatic detonation system and the explosive line, and the readiness of all services and personnel to conduct full-scale testing.
At the direction of M.G. Pervukhin, a unified control system for charge detonation and field automation was combined and tested.
After the general training experiment, the control system for the detonation of the product and the instruments of the experimental field, as directed by M.G. Pervukhin, was transferred under the leadership of K.I. Shchelkin, in whose charge it was before the explosion of the standard product.
On August 21, a plutonium charge and 4 neutron fuses were delivered to the test site by a special train, one of which was to be used to detonate a warhead.
On August 24, the head of the experiment, I.V., arrived at the test site. Kurchatov and member of the Special Council A.P. Zavenyagin.
The readiness of individual components of the RDS-1, the automation system and the detonation line, and all sectors of the experimental field was confirmed by the relevant acts. Head of experience I.V. Kurchatov, in accordance with the instructions of L.P. Beria, gives the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29 at 8 o'clock local time and to carry out preparatory operations starting from 8 o'clock on August 27.
Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria
The third stage - testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb
At 8 o'clock on August 27, near the central tower, in strict accordance with the requirements of proven technological instructions and work schedules, the assembly of the combat product began.
G.N. Flerov, D.P. Shirshov, A.I. Veretennikov installed equipment on the tower to check the neutron background of the charge in the last minutes before the explosion.
K.I. Shchelkin, in his report written at the training ground on September 13, 1949, notes that this “... work took place in a calm atmosphere. To many performers, as it turned out later, it seemed that it was not combat experience that was being carried out, but a repetition of the general control experience was being prepared.”
The explosive charge was delivered from the assembly building of site "N" the day before. By the end of the day on August 27, the electrical initiation system was installed and tested at the charge. All that remained was to install only one socket under the detonator cap on a removable explosive charge element, which was installed only after mounting the plutonium charge. The time for this operation has not yet come: it will be carried out after the installation of the plutonium charge.
On the afternoon of August 28, demolition workers carried out a final full inspection of the tower, prepared the automation for detonation and checked the demolition cable line. Control equipment was installed on the tower to remotely check the neutron background of the product in the last minutes before detonation. At 4 p.m., a plutonium charge and neutron fuses were delivered to the workshop near the tower. A reinforced security detail arrived.
Control panel for detonation of the first atomic bomb
On the night of August 28-29, Yu.B. Khariton and N.L. Dukhov with assistants and in the presence of I.V. Kurchatova, A.P. Zavenyagina, A.S. Apeksandrova, P.M. Zernov collected a plutonium charge and a neutron fuse in a special central part and inserted it into the explosive charge. The final installation of the charge was completed by 3 o'clock on August 29. under the leadership of A.Ya. Malsky and V.I Alferov.
Members of the special committee L.P. Beria, M.G. Pervukhin and V.A. The Makhnev controlled the progress of the final operations. They arrived at the tower around 19:00 and then left for the command post. At about 12 o'clock at night they again arrived at the field and were present during the work, first at the center, and after lifting the product onto the tower - at the command post until the explosion.
At 4 a.m. on August 29, having received permission from L.P. Beria and I.V. Kurchatov to lift the charge onto the tower, K.I. Shchelkin gave permission to remove the charge from the assembly workshop.
At 4.00 am, KB-11 installers under the leadership of D.A. Fishman rolled the product out of the assembly shop along a rail track and installed it in the cage of the tower's freight elevator.
David Abramovich Fishman
By 4 a.m. on August 29, after sealing the automation system and connectors on the blasting line, demolition men K.I. arrived at the tower. Shchelkin and S.N. Matveev with a set of detonators packed in a small suitcase.
Strong gusts of wind caused concern for the operation of the passenger elevator. However, a decision was made to lift K.I. Shchelkina and S.N. Matveev with detonator caps, and then A.P. Zavenyagina with A.S. Alexandrov.
The lifting of the people went smoothly. After this, the cargo compartment with the product was lifted up, accompanied by P.M. Zernova. G.L. Lominsky with the help of technician A.A. Izmailov took the elevator to the top of the tower.
At 5.00 all workers, with the exception of K.I. Shchelkina, S.N. Matveeva, G.P. Lominsky, AL. Zavenyagina, A.S. Apeksandrova and P.M. Zeriova, left the tower.
By 6.00 a.m., the charge was equipped with fuses and connected to the blasting circuit by KB-11 specialists K.I. Shchelkin, G.P. Lominsky and S.N. Matveev in the presence of generals A.L. Zavenyagin, A.S. Alexandrov and P.M. Zernova.
At a height of 30 m the cage was fixed. At the same time, neutron background monitoring equipment was connected.
All people were evacuated from the experimental field except security officers of the Ministry of State Security.
Inspecting the product, equipping it with caps, connecting it to the detonation circuit and re-inspecting it took about an hour, and was completed by 6.00. About the progress of all work P.M. Zernov reported to I.V. by telephone. Kurchatov.
To avoid troubles with the passenger elevator, the reliability of which was guaranteed in wind conditions of no more than 6 m/s, descent from the tower was carried out using stairs. The finalists were A.P. Zavenyagin and K.I. Shchepkin, who sealed the entrances to the tower.
K.I. Shchelkin writes in his report: “Only after the descent, the participants in the operation discovered a sharp deterioration in the weather. Ragged clouds were flying low over the field, covering the entire sky. It was drizzling. Sharp gusts of wind, in front of those on the field, tore down two balloons tied to a tree, raised for air observations."
After people were lowered from the tower and all the mechanisms were sealed, the security was removed and the evacuation of people from the field began.
At an intermediate point, three kilometers from the center of S.N. Matveev in the presence of A.P. Zavenyagin and K.I. Shchepkin turned on the connector, thereby connecting the equipment on the tower with the equipment at the command post. This operation ended all work on the field.
At 6.00 the bombers arrived at the command post and reported to L.P. Beria and I.V. Kurchatov about the complete readiness of the product for detonation, and the head of the test site, General S.G. Kolesnikov reported on the readiness of the test site.
General G.O. Komarov, the aviation commander, reported that due to a sharp deterioration in the weather, the departure of the plane with photographic equipment was delayed.
The approaching bad weather worried the leaders of the experiment. L.P. Beria, A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov walked out of the command post into the open in the hope of seeing a clearing up. But it was not expected. I.V. Kurchatov decides to move the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00.
General Babkin removed the sentry from the door of the demolition automation control room, and K.I. Shchelkin, S.L. Davydov, S.S. Chugunov, I.I. Denisov and S.N. Matveev entered the room and locked himself from the inside.
According to the design, the command post shelters had embrasures facing the field, through which it was supposed to observe the development of the explosion. But in recent days, on the advice of M.A. Sadovsky, in order to ensure the guaranteed safety of personnel, it was decided to cover the command post wall facing the field with earth up to the roof, thereby eliminating the possibility of observing the explosion. Even the periscope from the submarine in one of the command post rooms was forbidden to be used for observation during the explosion.
All rooms of the shelter had a loudspeaker connection with the control panel and a reverse clock. Therefore, everyone could hear and see how many minutes and seconds remained until “H”.
The entrance armored doors of the shelters were closed with reliable safe locks. The entire staff moved away from the walls, stood in the middle of the rooms, froze in anticipation of what was about to happen, counting down the remaining seconds along with the clock.
At 6.35, the operators turned on the power to the automation system. In "H" -12 minutes the field machine was turned on.
20 seconds before the explosion, the operator, at the command of the head of the explosion, turned on the main connector (switch) connecting the product to the automatic control system. From that moment on, all operations were performed by an automatic device. The last and main mechanism of the machine began to move. Its functions: turn on the power of the product and some of the field instruments 6 seconds before the explosion, turn on all other devices 1 second, and issue a detonation signal. However, it remained possible to stop the process with one movement of the hand at the command of the boss. There was no reason to stop.
The announcer (A.Ya. Malsky) reported:
-10 seconds left...
5 seconds left...
-4
-3
-2
-1
Zero
After the word “zero”, at exactly 7.00 on August 29, 1949, the entire area was illuminated with a blinding light, a crackling sound was heard in the electrical wires, and everything became quiet. The blinding light signaled that the USSR had successfully completed the development and testing of the first atomic bomb.
And here is how this historical moment is presented in the report on the test of the first atomic bomb, written by A.S. Alexandrov 09/13/49 and signed by I.V. Kurchatov, A.P. Zavenyagin, Yu.B. Khariton, M.G. Meshcheryakov, K.I. Shchelkin and M.A. Sadovsky.
“Exactly at 7 o’clock, simultaneously with the third short signal from the machine gun, the surroundings were illuminated by an unusually bright flash, and it became obvious to everyone that the atomic explosion had been successfully carried out. Exclams were heard: “Yes! Happened! It’s done!” It’s not difficult to imagine the state of people who, for so many years, were preparing to test a fundamentally new type of weapon.
After about 20 seconds, the doors to the command post were closed. Despite the great distance from the center of the field, the shock wave that arrived a few seconds later was accompanied by a powerful roar; windows in the command post building were broken and some of those present were stunned and felt severe pain in their ears. After the shock wave passed, the doors to the command post were opened, everyone present left the room and began to observe the field.
A huge black column of smoke and dust from the central part of the field rose to the sky and soon disappeared behind the clouds.. A huge cloud of dust stretched across the ground...
From the book of test participant A.I. Veretennikova ("Next to the Atomic Bomb", Moscow, 1995). “At the command post immediately after the explosion, a curious episode occurred. The neutron background was usually 2-3 mechanical counter counts per minute, that is, individual pulses arriving at it were recorded. And the constancy of the background, taking into account statistical fluctuations, was evidence of the safety of one of the most important elements of the “special product” - the neutron fuse (NZ) until the very last moment before the explosion. Flerov reported information about the neutron background to management out loud every five minutes. When the explosion had already occurred, no one was paying attention to the counter, and Beria looked at its readings and discovered that the last time, instead of one, he registered 3-4 pulses in both channels at once. He immediately demanded an explanation as to what happened to NZ? GN replied that these were apparently interferences with the equipment. And none of those present knew at that moment that one of the first registrations of electromagnetic phenomena accompanying a nuclear explosion unexpectedly took place here.
At the moment of the explosion, a luminous hemisphere appeared in place of the central part, the dimensions of which were 4-5 times greater than the dimensions of the solar disk, and the brightness was several times greater than the sun. After the first flash, those watching took off their glasses and saw a large fiery hemisphere of golden color, which then turned into a large raging flame, and the next moment was replaced by a rapidly rising column of smoke and dust...”
20 minutes after the explosion, two tanks equipped with lead protection were sent to the center of the field to conduct radiation reconnaissance and inspect the center of the field.
Intelligence revealed that all the center's structures had been demolished. In place of the central tower, a crater with a diameter of 3 and a depth of 1.5 meters formed; radioactivity exceeded 50 thousand microroentgens per second. The soil in the center of the field melted and a continuous crust of slag formed. Civil buildings and industrial structures were completely or partially destroyed.
As V.I. recalls Zhuchikhin, who came out of the command post, “saw a picture of horrific destruction: the windows and doors of the mechanical workshop, the equipment warehouse, the FAS and VIA buildings were completely knocked out and distorted. In some places, the roofs of the buildings collapsed. The Finnish houses acquired an unrecognizable appearance. On closer examination, it became it is clear that the destruction of the houses was on such a scale that restoration was out of the question. The leadership of the tests, which included L.P. Beria with his bodyguard - a colonel, armed to the teeth (although it was difficult to imagine from whom he was supposed to shoot back), leaving the command post, hugging and kissing, congratulating each other on their success."
The next day, August 30, 1949, a trip took place to the experimental field, where a terrible picture of the great massacre presented itself.
The dosimetry service quickly managed to limit the zones of dangerous radiation conditions. For a period of no more than 15 minutes, it was allowed to enter a zone limited to a radius of approximately 2 km from the epicenter. But even from this distance the entire field was clearly visible. You can see planes broken in half or lying on their backs with their wheels upside down, tanks lying on their sides with knocked-down turrets, cannons, one of which had a carriage in one place and a barrel stuck with the breech up in another, a ship's deckhouse turned into a pile of twisted metal, and all ten burnt Pobeda cars.
The railway and highway bridges were twisted and thrown back 20-30 m to their place. The cars and cars located on the bridges, half-burnt, were scattered across the steppe at a distance of 50-80 m from the installation site.
Urban residential buildings and a workshop building were completely destroyed. Panel and log residential buildings at a distance of up to 5 km were completely destroyed. Several power line poles were mutilated and torn from their mounting points.
As academician Yu. Khariton noted in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper on December 8, 1992, the first Soviet atomic charge was manufactured according to the American model with the help of information received from K. Fuchs. According to the academician, when government awards were presented to participants in the Soviet atomic project, Stalin, satisfied that there was no American monopoly in this area, remarked: “If we had been one to a year and a half late, we probably would have tried this charge on ourselves
About the creation of RDS-1, see the website: For advanced - Creation of RDS-1
The one who invented the atomic bomb could not even imagine what tragic consequences this miracle invention of the 20th century could lead to. It was a very long journey before the residents of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki experienced this superweapon.
A start
In April 1903, Paul Langevin's friends gathered in the Parisian garden of France. The reason was the defense of the dissertation of the young and talented scientist Marie Curie. Among the distinguished guests was the famous English physicist Sir Ernest Rutherford. In the midst of the fun, the lights were turned off. announced to everyone that there would be a surprise. With a solemn look, Pierre Curie brought in a small tube with radium salts, which shone with a green light, causing extraordinary delight among those present. Subsequently, the guests heatedly discussed the future of this phenomenon. Everyone agreed that radium would solve the acute problem of energy shortages. This inspired everyone for new research and further prospects. If they had been told then that laboratory work with radioactive elements would lay the foundation for the terrible weapons of the 20th century, it is not known what their reaction would have been. It was then that the story of the atomic bomb began, killing hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians.
Playing ahead
On December 17, 1938, the German scientist Otto Gann obtained irrefutable evidence of the decay of uranium into smaller elementary particles. Essentially, he managed to split the atom. In the scientific world, this was regarded as a new milestone in the history of mankind. Otto Gann did not share the political views of the Third Reich. Therefore, in the same year, 1938, the scientist was forced to move to Stockholm, where, together with Friedrich Strassmann, he continued his scientific research. Fearing that Nazi Germany will be the first to receive terrible weapons, he writes a letter warning about this. The news of a possible advance greatly alarmed the US government. The Americans began to act quickly and decisively.
Who created the atomic bomb? American project
Even before the group, many of whom were refugees from the Nazi regime in Europe, was tasked with the development of nuclear weapons. Initial research, it is worth noting, was carried out in Nazi Germany. In 1940, the government of the United States of America began funding its own program to develop atomic weapons. An incredible sum of two and a half billion dollars was allocated to implement the project. Outstanding physicists of the 20th century were invited to implement this secret project, among whom were more than ten Nobel laureates. In total, about 130 thousand employees were involved, among whom were not only military personnel, but also civilians. The development team was headed by Colonel Leslie Richard Groves, and Robert Oppenheimer became the scientific director. He is the man who invented the atomic bomb. A special secret engineering building was built in the Manhattan area, which we know under the code name “Manhattan Project”. Over the next few years, scientists from the secret project worked on the problem of nuclear fission of uranium and plutonium.
The non-peaceful atom of Igor Kurchatov
Today, every schoolchild will be able to answer the question of who invented the atomic bomb in the Soviet Union. And then, in the early 30s of the last century, no one knew this.
In 1932, Academician Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov was one of the first in the world to begin studying the atomic nucleus. Gathering like-minded people around him, Igor Vasilyevich created the first cyclotron in Europe in 1937. In the same year, he and his like-minded people created the first artificial nuclei.
In 1939, I.V. Kurchatov began studying a new direction - nuclear physics. After several laboratory successes in studying this phenomenon, the scientist receives at his disposal a secret research center, which was named “Laboratory No. 2”. Nowadays this classified object is called "Arzamas-16".
The target direction of this center was the serious research and creation of nuclear weapons. Now it becomes obvious who created the atomic bomb in the Soviet Union. His team then consisted of only ten people.
There will be an atomic bomb
By the end of 1945, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov managed to assemble a serious team of scientists numbering more than a hundred people. The best minds of various scientific specializations came to the laboratory from all over the country to create atomic weapons. After the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Soviet scientists realized that this could be done with the Soviet Union. "Laboratory No. 2" receives from the country's leadership a sharp increase in funding and a large influx of qualified personnel. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria is appointed responsible for such an important project. The enormous efforts of Soviet scientists have borne fruit.
Semipalatinsk test site
The atomic bomb in the USSR was first tested at the test site in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). On August 29, 1949, a nuclear device with a yield of 22 kilotons shook the Kazakh soil. Nobel laureate physicist Otto Hanz said: “This is good news. If Russia has atomic weapons, then there will be no war.” It was this atomic bomb in the USSR, encrypted as product No. 501, or RDS-1, that eliminated the US monopoly on nuclear weapons.
Atomic bomb. Year 1945
In the early morning of July 16, the Manhattan Project conducted its first successful test of an atomic device - a plutonium bomb - at the Alamogordo test site in New Mexico, USA.
The money invested in the project was well spent. The first in the history of mankind was carried out at 5:30 am.
“We have done the devil’s work,” the one who invented the atomic bomb in the USA, later called “the father of the atomic bomb,” will say later.
Japan will not capitulate
By the time of the final and successful testing of the atomic bomb, Soviet troops and allies had finally defeated Nazi Germany. However, there was one state that promised to fight to the end for dominance in the Pacific Ocean. From mid-April to mid-July 1945, the Japanese army repeatedly carried out air strikes against allied forces, thereby inflicting heavy losses on the US army. At the end of July 1945, the militaristic Japanese government rejected the Allied demand for surrender under the Potsdam Declaration. It stated, in particular, that in case of disobedience, the Japanese army would face rapid and complete destruction.
The President agrees
The American government kept its word and began a targeted bombing of Japanese military positions. Air strikes did not bring the desired result, and US President Harry Truman decides to invade Japanese territory by American troops. However, the military command dissuades its president from such a decision, citing the fact that an American invasion would entail a large number of casualties.
At the suggestion of Henry Lewis Stimson and Dwight David Eisenhower, it was decided to use a more effective way to end the war. A big supporter of the atomic bomb, US Presidential Secretary James Francis Byrnes, believed that the bombing of Japanese territories would finally end the war and put the United States in a dominant position, which would have a positive impact on the further course of events in the post-war world. Thus, US President Harry Truman was convinced that this was the only correct option.
Atomic bomb. Hiroshima
The small Japanese city of Hiroshima with a population of just over 350 thousand people, located five hundred miles from the Japanese capital Tokyo, was chosen as the first target. After the modified B-29 Enola Gay bomber arrived at the US naval base on Tinian Island, an atomic bomb was installed on board the aircraft. Hiroshima was to experience the effects of 9 thousand pounds of uranium-235.
This never-before-seen weapon was intended for civilians in a small Japanese town. The bomber's commander was Colonel Paul Warfield Tibbetts Jr. The US atomic bomb bore the cynical name “Baby”. On the morning of August 6, 1945, at approximately 8:15 a.m., the American “Little” was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. About 15 thousand tons of TNT destroyed all life within a radius of five square miles. One hundred and forty thousand city residents died in a matter of seconds. The surviving Japanese died a painful death from radiation sickness.
They were destroyed by the American atomic “Baby”. However, the devastation of Hiroshima did not cause the immediate surrender of Japan, as everyone expected. Then it was decided to carry out another bombing of Japanese territory.
Nagasaki. The sky is on fire
The American atomic bomb “Fat Man” was installed on board a B-29 aircraft on August 9, 1945, still there, at the US naval base in Tinian. This time the aircraft commander was Major Charles Sweeney. Initially, the strategic target was the city of Kokura.
However, weather conditions did not allow the plan to be carried out; heavy clouds interfered. Charles Sweeney went into the second round. At 11:02 a.m., the American nuclear “Fat Man” engulfed Nagasaki. It was a more powerful destructive air strike, which was several times stronger than the bombing in Hiroshima. Nagasaki tested an atomic weapon weighing about 10 thousand pounds and 22 kilotons of TNT.
The geographic location of the Japanese city reduced the expected effect. The thing is that the city is located in a narrow valley between the mountains. Therefore, the destruction of 2.6 square miles did not reveal the full potential of American weapons. The Nagasaki atomic bomb test is considered the failed Manhattan Project.
Japan surrendered
At noon on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced his country's surrender in a radio address to the people of Japan. This news quickly spread around the world. Celebrations began in the United States of America to mark the victory over Japan. The people rejoiced.
On September 2, 1945, a formal agreement to end the war was signed aboard the American battleship Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay. Thus ended the most brutal and bloody war in human history.
For six long years, the world community has been moving towards this significant date - since September 1, 1939, when the first shots of Nazi Germany were fired in Poland.
Peaceful atom
In total, 124 nuclear explosions were carried out in the Soviet Union. What is characteristic is that all of them were carried out for the benefit of the national economy. Only three of them were accidents that resulted in the leakage of radioactive elements. Programs for the use of peaceful atoms were implemented in only two countries - the USA and the Soviet Union. Nuclear peaceful energy also knows an example of a global catastrophe, when a reactor exploded at the fourth power unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
On August 29, 1949, at 7 a.m. Moscow time, the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was successfully tested at the Semipalatinsk training ground No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
The first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was created at KB-11 (now the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, VNIIEF) under the scientific supervision of Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and Yuli Borisovich Khariton. In 1946, Yu. B. Khariton drew up technical specifications for the development of an atomic bomb, which was structurally reminiscent of the American “Fat Man” bomb. The RDS-1 bomb was a plutonium aviation atomic bomb of a characteristic “drop-shaped” shape, weighing 4.7 tons, with a diameter of 1.5 m and a length of 3.3 m.
Before the atomic explosion, the functionality of the systems and mechanisms of the bomb when dropped from an aircraft was successfully tested without a plutonium charge. On August 21, 1949, a plutonium charge and four neutron fuses were delivered to the test site by a special train, one of which was to be used to detonate a warhead. Kurchatov, in accordance with the instructions of L.P. Beria, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29 at 8 a.m. local time.
On the night of August 29, the charge was assembled, and the final installation was completed by 3 a.m. Over the next three hours, the charge was raised to the test tower, equipped with fuses and connected to the demolition circuit. Members of the special committee L.P. Beria, M.G. Pervukhin and V.A. Makhnev controlled the progress of the final operations. However, due to deteriorating weather, all work provided for by the approved regulations was decided to be carried out one hour earlier.
At 6:35 a.m. the operators turned on the power to the automation system, and at 6:48 a.m. The test field machine was turned on. At exactly 7 a.m. on August 29, the first atomic bomb of the Soviet Union was successfully tested at the test site in Semipalatinsk. In 20 minutes. After the explosion, two tanks equipped with lead protection were sent to the center of the field to conduct radiation reconnaissance and inspect the center of the field.
On October 28, 1949, L.P. Beria reported to J.V. Stalin on the results of testing the first atomic bomb. For the successful development and testing of the atomic bomb, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 29, 1949, a large group of leading researchers, designers, and technologists were awarded orders and medals of the USSR; many were awarded the title of Stalin Prize laureates, and the direct developers of the nuclear charge were awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
Lit.: Andryushin I. A., Chernyshev A. K., Yudin Yu. A. Taming the Core: Pages from the History of Nuclear Weapons and the USSR Nuclear Infrastructure. Sarov, 2003; Goncharov G. A., Ryabev L. D. On the creation of the first domestic bomb // USSR Atomic Project. Documents and materials. Book 6. M., 2006. P. 33; Gubarev B. White Archipelago: several little-known pages from the history of the creation of the A-bomb // Science and Life. 2000. No. 3; Nuclear tests of the USSR. Sarov, 1997. T. 1.
The “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb, Academician Igor Kurchatov, was born on January 12, 1903 in the Simsky Plant in the Ufa province (today it is the city of Sim in the Chelyabinsk region). He is called one of the founders of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Having graduated with honors from the Simferopol men's gymnasium and evening vocational school, in September 1920 Kurchatov entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Tauride University. Three years later, he successfully graduated from the university ahead of schedule. In 1930, Kurchatov headed the physics department of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology.
"RG" talks about the stages of creating the first Soviet atomic bomb, which was successfully tested in August 1949.
Pre-Kurchatov era
Work on the atomic nucleus in the USSR began back in the 1930s. Physicists and chemists not only from Soviet scientific centers, but also foreign specialists took part in the all-Union conferences of the USSR Academy of Sciences of that time.
In 1932, radium samples were obtained, and in 1939, the chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. The year 1940 was a landmark year in the development of the nuclear program: employees of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology submitted an application for a breakthrough invention at that time: the design of an atomic bomb and methods for producing uranium-235. For the first time, conventional explosives were proposed to be used as a fuse to create a critical mass and initiate a chain reaction. In the future, nuclear bombs were detonated in this way, and the centrifugal method proposed by UPTI scientists is still the basis for the industrial separation of uranium isotopes.
There were also significant flaws in the Kharkov residents’ proposals. As Alexander Medved, candidate of technical sciences, noted in his article for the scientific and technical magazine “Engine”, “the uranium charge scheme proposed by the authors was, in principle, not workable.... However, the value of the authors’ proposal was great, since this particular scheme can be considered the first discussed in our country at the official level, a proposal for the design of the nuclear bomb itself."
The application circulated through the authorities for a long time, but was never accepted, and eventually ended up on a shelf labeled “top secret.”
By the way, in the same fortieth year, at the all-Union conference, Kurchatov presented a report on the fission of heavy nuclei, which was a breakthrough in solving the practical issue of implementing a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.
What is more important - tanks or bombs?
After Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Moscow and Leningrad institutes dealing with problems of nuclear physics were evacuated.
Beria, as the head of strategic intelligence, knew that major physicists in the West considered atomic weapons an achievable reality. According to historians, back in September 1939, the future scientific director of the work on the creation of the American atomic bomb, Robert Oppenheimer, came to the USSR incognito. From him, the Soviet leadership could hear for the first time about the possibility of obtaining superweapons. Everyone - both politicians and scientists - understood that the creation of a nuclear bomb was possible, and its appearance by the enemy would bring irreparable troubles.
In 1941, the USSR began to receive intelligence information from the USA and Great Britain about the deployment of intensive work on the creation of nuclear weapons.
Academician Pyotr Kapitsa, speaking on October 12, 1941 at an anti-fascist meeting of scientists, said: “... an atomic bomb of even a small size, if feasible, could easily destroy a large capital city with several million people...”.
On September 28, 1942, the resolution “On the organization of work on uranium” was adopted - this date is considered the start of the Soviet nuclear project. In the spring of the following year, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created specifically for the production of the first Soviet bomb. The question arose: who should be entrusted with the leadership of the newly created structure.
“We need to find a talented and relatively young physicist so that solving the atomic problem becomes the only work of his life. And we will give him power, make him an academician and, of course, we will vigilantly control him,” Stalin ordered.
Initially, the list of candidates consisted of about fifty names. Beria suggested choosing Kurchatov, and in October 1943 he was summoned to Moscow for a viewing. Now the scientific center, into which the laboratory has been transformed over the years, bears the name of its first director - “Kurchatov Institute”.
"Stalin's jet engine"
On April 9, 1946, a resolution was adopted to create a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. The first production buildings in the Mordovian Nature Reserve were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.
The Soviet prototype was named RDS-1, which, according to one version, meant “special jet engine.” Later, the abbreviation began to be deciphered as “Stalin’s jet engine” or “Russia does it itself.” The bomb was also known as “product 501” and atomic charge “1-200”. By the way, to ensure secrecy, the bomb was referred to in documents as a “rocket engine.”
RDS-1 was a 22 kiloton device. Yes, the USSR carried out its own development of atomic weapons, but the need to catch up with the States, which had gone ahead during the war, pushed domestic science to actively use intelligence data. So, the American “Fat Man” was taken as a basis. The US dropped a bomb under this code name on August 9, 1945 on Nagasaki, Japan. “Fat Man” worked on the basis of the decay of plutonium-239 and had an implosive detonation scheme: conventional explosive charges explode along the perimeter of the fissile substance, which create a blast wave that “compresses” the substance in the center and initiates a chain reaction. By the way, this scheme was later found to be ineffective.
RDS-1 was designed as a free-falling bomb of large diameter and mass. The charge of an atomic explosive device is made of plutonium. The bomb's ballistic body and electrical equipment were of domestic design. Structurally, the RDS-1 included a nuclear charge, a ballistic body of a large-diameter aerial bomb, an explosive device and equipment for automatic charge detonation systems with safety systems.
Uranium deficiency
Taking the American plutonium bomb as a basis, Soviet physics was faced with a problem that had to be solved in a short time: at the time of development, plutonium production had not yet begun in the USSR.
At the initial stage, captured uranium was used. But a large industrial reactor required at least 150 tons of the substance. At the end of 1945, mines in Czechoslovakia and East Germany resumed operations. In 1946, uranium deposits were found in Kolyma, the Chita region, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the North Caucasus, near Pyatigorsk.
The first industrial reactor and radiochemical plant "Mayak" began to be built in the Urals, near the city of Kyshtym, 100 km north of Chelyabinsk. Kurchatov personally supervised the loading of uranium into the reactor. In 1947, the construction of three more nuclear cities began: two in the Middle Urals (Sverdlovsk-44 and Sverdlovsk-45) and one in the Gorky region (Arzamas-16).
Construction work proceeded at a rapid pace, but there was not enough uranium. Even at the beginning of 1948, the first industrial reactor could not be launched. The uranium was loaded by June 7, 1948.
Kurchatov took over the functions of the chief operator of the reactor control panel. Between eleven and twelve o'clock at night he began an experiment on the physical start-up of the reactor. At zero hours thirty minutes on June 8, 1948, the reactor reached a power of one hundred kilowatts, after which Kurchatov suppressed the chain reaction. The next stage of reactor preparation lasted two days. After supplying cooling water, it became clear that the uranium available in the reactor was not enough to carry out a chain reaction. Only after loading the fifth portion did the reactor reach a critical state, and a chain reaction became possible again. This happened on the tenth of June at eight o'clock in the morning.
On June 17, Kurchatov made an entry in the operational journal of the shift supervisors: “I am warning that if the water supply is stopped there will be an explosion, so under no circumstances should the water supply be stopped... It is necessary to monitor the water level in emergency tanks and the operation of pumping stations ".
On June 19, 1948, at 12:45 p.m., the commercial launch of the first nuclear reactor in Eurasia took place.
Successful tests
The quantities contained in the American bomb were accumulated in the USSR in June 1949.
The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, in accordance with Beria’s instructions, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29.
A section of the waterless Irtysh steppe in Kazakhstan, 170 kilometers west of Semipalatinsk, was allocated for the test site. A metal lattice tower 37.5 meters high was mounted in the center of the experimental field, approximately 20 kilometers in diameter. RDS-1 was installed on it.
The charge was a multilayer structure in which the active substance was transferred to a critical state by compressing it through a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.
After the explosion, the tower was completely destroyed, leaving a crater in its place. But the main damage was from the shock wave. Eyewitnesses described that when the next day - August 30 - a trip to the experimental field took place, the test participants saw a terrible picture: the railway and highway bridges were twisted and thrown back 20-30 meters, wagons and cars were scattered across the steppe at a distance of 50-80 meters from the installation site, residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks on which the impact force was tested lay on their sides with their turrets knocked down, the guns turned into a pile of twisted metal, and ten “test” Pobeda vehicles were burned out.
A total of 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. Currently, a mock-up of the bomb is on display at the Nuclear Weapons Museum in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16).
Almost seven decades ago, on October 29, 1949, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued four top-secret decrees awarding 845 people the titles of Heroes of Socialist Labor, the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner of Labor and the Badge of Honor. In none of them was it said in relation to any of the recipients what exactly he was awarded for: the standard wording “for exceptional services to the state while performing a special task” appeared everywhere. Even for the Soviet Union, accustomed to secrecy, this was a rare occurrence. Meanwhile, the recipients themselves knew very well, of course, what kind of “exceptional merits” were meant. All 845 people were, to a greater or lesser extent, directly connected with the creation of the first nuclear bomb of the USSR.
It was not strange for the awardees that both the project itself and its success were shrouded in a thick veil of secrecy. After all, they all knew well that they owed their success to a large extent to the courage and professionalism of Soviet intelligence officers, who for eight years had been supplying scientists and engineers with top-secret information from abroad. And such a high assessment that the creators of the Soviet atomic bomb deserved was not exaggerated. As one of the creators of the bomb, academician Yuli Khariton, recalled, at the presentation ceremony Stalin suddenly said: “If we had been one to a year and a half late, we would probably have tried this charge on ourselves.” And this is not an exaggeration...
Atomic bomb sample... 1940
The Soviet Union came to the idea of creating a bomb that uses the energy of a nuclear chain reaction almost simultaneously with Germany and the United States. The first officially considered project of this type of weapon was presented in 1940 by a group of scientists from the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology under the leadership of Friedrich Lange. It was in this project that for the first time in the USSR, a scheme for detonating conventional explosives, which later became classic for all nuclear weapons, was proposed, due to which two subcritical masses of uranium are almost instantly formed into a supercritical one.
The project received negative reviews and was not considered further. But the work on which it was based continued, and not only in Kharkov. At least four large institutes were involved in atomic issues in the pre-war USSR - in Leningrad, Kharkov and Moscow, and the work was supervised by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Vyacheslav Molotov. Soon after the presentation of Lange's project, in January 1941, the Soviet government made a logical decision to classify domestic atomic research. It was clear that they could really lead to the creation of a new type of powerful weapon, and such information should not be scattered, especially since it was at that time that the first intelligence data on the American atomic project was received - and Moscow did not want to risk its own.
The natural course of events was interrupted by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. But, despite the fact that all Soviet industry and science were very quickly transferred to a military footing and began to provide the army with the most urgent developments and inventions, strength and means were also found to continue the atomic project. Although not right away. The resumption of research must be counted from the resolution of the State Defense Committee of February 11, 1943, which stipulated the beginning of practical work on the creation of an atomic bomb.
Project "Enormoz"
By this time, Soviet foreign intelligence was already working hard to obtain information on the Enormoz project - this is how the American atomic project was called in operational documents. The first meaningful data indicating that the West was seriously engaged in the creation of uranium weapons came from the London station in September 1941. And at the end of the same year, a message comes from the same source that America and Great Britain agreed to coordinate the efforts of their scientists in the field of atomic energy research. In war conditions, this could only be interpreted in one way: the allies were working on creating atomic weapons. And in February 1942, intelligence received documentary evidence that Germany was actively doing the same thing.
As the efforts of Soviet scientists, working according to their own plans, advanced, intelligence work intensified to obtain information about the American and British atomic projects. In December 1942, it became finally clear that the United States was clearly ahead of Britain in this area, and the main efforts were focused on obtaining data from overseas. In fact, every step of the participants in the “Manhattan Project,” as the work on creating an atomic bomb in the United States was called, was closely monitored by Soviet intelligence. Suffice it to say that the most detailed information about the structure of the first real atomic bomb was received in Moscow less than two weeks after it was assembled in America.
That is why the boastful message of the new US President Harry Truman, who decided to stun Stalin at the Potsdam Conference with a statement that America had a new weapon of unprecedented destructive power, did not cause the reaction that the American was counting on. The Soviet leader listened calmly, nodded, and said nothing. Foreigners were sure that Stalin simply did not understand anything. In fact, the leader of the USSR sensibly appreciated Truman’s words and on the same evening demanded that Soviet specialists speed up work on creating their own atomic bomb as much as possible. But it was no longer possible to overtake America. Less than a month later, the first atomic mushroom grew over Hiroshima, and three days later - over Nagasaki. And over the Soviet Union hung the shadow of a new, nuclear war, and not with anyone, but with former allies.
Time forward!
Now, seventy years later, no one is surprised that the Soviet Union received the much-needed reserve of time to create its own superbomb, despite sharply deteriorating relations with ex-partners in the anti-Hitler coalition. After all, already on March 5, 1946, six months after the first atomic bombings, Winston Churchill’s famous Fulton speech was made, which marked the beginning of the Cold War. But, according to the plans of Washington and its allies, it was supposed to develop into a hot one later - at the end of 1949. After all, as it was hoped overseas, the USSR was not supposed to receive its own atomic weapons before the mid-1950s, which means there was nowhere to rush.
Atomic bomb tests. Photo: U.S. Air Force/AR
From today's heights, it seems surprising that the date of the start of the new world war - or rather, one of the dates of one of the main plans, Fleetwood - and the date of testing the first Soviet nuclear bomb: 1949. But in reality everything is natural. The foreign policy situation was heating up quickly, the former allies were speaking more and more harshly to each other. And in 1948, it became absolutely clear that Moscow and Washington, apparently, would no longer be able to come to an agreement with each other. Hence the need to count down the time before the start of a new war: a year is the deadline during which countries that have recently emerged from a colossal war can fully prepare for a new one, moreover, with a state that bore the brunt of the Victory on its shoulders. Even the nuclear monopoly did not give the United States the opportunity to shorten the preparation for war.
Foreign “accents” of the Soviet atomic bomb
We all understood this perfectly well. Since 1945, all work related to the atomic project has sharply intensified. During the first two post-war years, the USSR, tormented by the war and having lost a considerable part of its industrial potential, managed to create a colossal nuclear industry from scratch. Future nuclear centers emerged, such as Chelyabinsk-40, Arzamas-16, Obninsk, and large scientific institutes and production facilities emerged.
Not so long ago, a common point of view on the history of the Soviet atomic project was this: they say, if not for intelligence, USSR scientists would not have been able to create any atomic bomb. In reality, everything was far from being as clear as the revisionists of Russian history tried to show. In fact, the data obtained by Soviet intelligence about the American atomic project allowed our scientists to avoid many mistakes that their American colleagues who had gone ahead inevitably had to make (whom, let us recall, the war did not seriously interfere with their work: the enemy did not invade US territory, and the country did not lose a few months half of the industry). In addition, intelligence data undoubtedly helped Soviet specialists evaluate the most advantageous designs and technical solutions that made it possible to assemble their own, more advanced atomic bomb.
And if we talk about the degree of foreign influence on the Soviet nuclear project, then, rather, we need to remember the several hundred German nuclear specialists who worked at two secret facilities near Sukhumi - in the prototype of the future Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology. They really helped greatly to advance work on the “product” - the first atomic bomb of the USSR, so much so that many of them were awarded Soviet orders by the same secret decrees of October 29, 1949. Most of these specialists went back to Germany five years later, settling mostly in the GDR (although there were also some who went to the West).
Objectively speaking, the first Soviet atomic bomb had, so to speak, more than one “accent.” After all, it was born as a result of a colossal cooperation of efforts of many people - both those who worked on the project of their own free will, and those who were involved in the work as prisoners of war or interned specialists. But the country, which at all costs needed to quickly obtain weapons that would equalize its chances with the ex-allies who were rapidly turning into mortal enemies, had no time for sentimentality.
Source: RIA Novosti
Russia does it itself!
In the documents relating to the creation of the first nuclear bomb of the USSR, the term “product”, which later became popular, had not yet been encountered. Much more often it was officially called a “special jet engine,” or RDS for short. Although, of course, there was nothing reactive in the work on this design: the whole point was only in the strictest requirements of secrecy.
With the light hand of Academician Yuri Khariton, the unofficial decoding “Russia does it itself” very quickly became attached to the abbreviation RDS. There was a considerable amount of irony in this, since everyone knew how much the information obtained by intelligence had given our nuclear scientists, but also a large share of truth. After all, if the design of the first Soviet nuclear bomb was very similar to the American one (simply because the most optimal one was chosen, and the laws of physics and mathematics do not have national characteristics), then, say, the ballistic body and electronic filling of the first bomb were a purely domestic development.
When work on the Soviet atomic project had progressed far enough, the USSR leadership formulated tactical and technical requirements for the first atomic bombs. It was decided to simultaneously develop two types: an implosion-type plutonium bomb and a cannon-type uranium bomb, similar to that used by the Americans. The first received the RDS-1 index, the second, respectively, RDS-2.
According to the plan, RDS-1 was to be submitted for state tests by explosion in January 1948. But these deadlines could not be met: problems arose with the production and processing of the required amount of weapons-grade plutonium for its equipment. It was received only a year and a half later, in August 1949, and immediately went to Arzamas-16, where the almost finished first Soviet atomic bomb was waiting. Within a few days, specialists from the future VNIIEF completed the assembly of the “product”, and it went to the Semipalatinsk test site for testing.
The first rivet of Russia's nuclear shield
The first nuclear bomb of the USSR was detonated at seven o'clock in the morning on August 29, 1949. Almost a month passed before overseas people recovered from the shock caused by intelligence reports about the successful testing of our own “big stick” in our country. Only on September 23, Harry Truman, who had not so long ago boastfully informed Stalin about America’s successes in creating atomic weapons, made a statement that the same type of weapons was now available in the USSR.
Presentation of a multimedia installation in honor of the 65th anniversary of the creation of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Photo: Geodakyan Artem / TASS
Oddly enough, Moscow was in no hurry to confirm the Americans’ statements. On the contrary, TASS actually came out with a refutation of the American statement, arguing that the whole point is the colossal scale of construction in the USSR, which also involves the use of blasting operations using the latest technologies. True, at the end of the Tassov statement there was a more than transparent hint about possessing its own nuclear weapons. The agency reminded everyone interested that back on November 6, 1947, USSR Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov stated that no secret of the atomic bomb had existed for a long time.
And this was twice true. By 1947, no information about atomic weapons was any longer a secret for the USSR, and by the end of the summer of 1949, it was no longer a secret to anyone that the Soviet Union had restored strategic parity with its main rival, the United States. A parity that has persisted for six decades. Parity, which is supported by Russia’s nuclear shield and which began on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.
