According to textbooks, the USSR entered World War II on June 22, 1941, because it was attacked by Germany. But if you believe the myth-makers, then Stalin sought to conclude an alliance with Hitler, pushed him with all his might to start the war, involved the USSR in World War II already in 1939 and agreed with Hitler on the division of the world. Two “related” totalitarian regimes, in theory, should act together, and their quarrel on June 22, 1941 is a historical misunderstanding.
Let's try to figure out how and why the rapprochement between Germany and the USSR began in 1939, what goals Stalin pursued in his foreign policy, and whether the USSR participated in Germany's war with Great Britain, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway, that is, in the initial stage of the Second World War. world war?
Out of convenience or out of love? Chronicle of the diplomatic game
In 1989, the former Soviet intelligence officer and then English writer V. Suvorov shocked Western and then Russian readers with the statement: Stalin started the Second World War, deliberately provoking it with a pact with Hitler. If it were not for the journalistic sharpness of this conclusion, there would not be much novelty in it. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has long been compromising evidence on Stalin. But the leaders of Great Britain and France also concluded a pact with Hitler and Mussolini in Munich. However, an important question remains: Stalin agreed to a rapprochement with Hitler under the pressure of circumstances, or did he strive for an alliance with Germany and planned this rapprochement as desirable, as part of his diabolical plan?
The authors who believe that “Moscow took the initiative in raising the issue of creating a new political basis for relations between the USSR and Germany” refer to rather late documents dating back to May 1939. Of course, the issue of whether what benefits and disadvantages will the USSR receive if relations with Germany are normalized. There was no talk of allied relations. In 1933–1938 Relations between the two countries were at their worst.
For every step towards rapprochement or away from it taken by the Soviet and German sides, an equally symmetrical one can be found. Foreign policy in its daily routine resembles an intricate dance. The parties come together and separate, take steps towards and to the side, then ceremoniously leave. But ideologically it is important to proclaim “who started it first.” If they are Germans, then Stalin’s policy is pragmatic. He gave in to Hitler's "persecutions." If Stalin took the initiative, he is a criminal, an accomplice of Hitler in starting the Second World War, and even its initiator.
German researcher I. Fleischhauer writes: “The majority of German authors, both before and now, when describing the circumstances of the emergence of the pact, express the opinion that Stalin, who with relative constancy sought an agreement with the National Socialists, since the autumn of 1938, having recovered from the shock caused by the Munich agreement, so intensified his attempts at rapprochement with Germany that Hitler, who was preparing the invasion of Poland in the summer of 1939, could only respond to repeated proposals in order to conclude the agreement so desired by the Soviet side.” The ideological subtext of this position of the German authors is clear.
The history of the “diplomatic dance” of 1939 has been studied in detail. Since it is so important to discover the first initiative, we will give a chronicle of events.
December 1937 - Goering invited Soviet Ambassador J. Surits and during the conversation said: “I am a supporter of the development of economic relations with the USSR and, as the head of the economy, I understand their importance.” They talked about the German economic plan, and then Goering talked about foreign policy issues, Bismarck's covenants not to fight with Russia and the mistake of Wilhelm II, who violated these covenants.
September 30, 1938 - Munich Pact between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France on the division of Czechoslovakia. The same solution to other international problems from Spain to Ukraine is being discussed. The USSR found itself in foreign policy isolation, in the face of a hostile Europe. The policy of “collective security” has failed.
On December 16, at a working meeting dedicated to the routine extension of the Soviet-German trade agreement, the head of the Eastern European reference department of the political and economic department of the German Foreign Ministry, Schnurre, informed the deputy Soviet trade representative Skosyrev that Germany was ready to provide a loan to the USSR in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. These proposals became the starting point for Soviet-German rapprochement - so far unstable and not guaranteed by anything. The German credit initiative was economically beneficial and resonated. It was agreed that on January 30 a small delegation led by Schnurre would go to Moscow. The Soviet side even prepared a list of what would be useful for the USSR to purchase from Germany with this loan.
On January 12, 1939, at a New Year's reception for heads of diplomatic missions, Hitler suddenly approached Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov, “asked about living in Berlin, about family, about a trip to Moscow, emphasized that he knew about my visit to Schulenburg in Moscow, wished success and said goodbye." This has never happened before. The Fuhrer's affection for the Soviet ambassador caused a furor in the diplomatic corps: what does this mean!? But Hitler considered such a demonstration to be the maximum publicity of his intentions. Hitler could not do more without a reciprocal expression of sympathy from the Soviet side. But they weren’t there. Therefore, when reports about Schnurre’s trip leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop banned the visit, the negotiations broke down, which for some time convinced Stalin that the Germans’ economic intentions were not serious (there was no talk of a “political basis” yet).
On March 8, Hitler announced to his inner circle his intention to first deal with the West, and only then with the USSR.
On March 10, at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin delivered a report in which he outlined a picture of the world struggle: “Warmongers” are pitting the USSR and Germany against each other, trying to “rakes in the heat with the wrong hands,” that is, to restrain the aggressor at the cost of sacrifices on the part of the USSR, and by themselves stay safe. Of course, the USSR, true to its policy of “collective security,” is still ready to help victims of aggression, but only on the condition that Western countries also do this. Stalin believes that supporters of appeasement in England and France would not want to prevent “Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting entangled in a war with the Soviet Union, allowing all participants in the war to sink deeply into the mire of war, encouraging them in this on the sly, allowing them to weaken and exhaust each other.” friend, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to appear on stage with fresh forces, to act, of course, in the “interests of peace,” and dictate their terms to the weakened participants in the war. Both cheap and cute!” The invasion of the USSR will be the beginning of the end for Hitler, the West will use him in its own interests and throw him into the dustbin of history.
There are no calls for rapprochement with the Nazis in the speech; there is only an attempt to dissuade them from attacking the USSR. There is an analysis of Hitler's intentions, which would be beneficial to Stalin. There is an intention to “consolidate” the Fuhrer’s anti-Western intentions, which were only rumored. There is an attempt to pit the “imperialists” against each other.
On March 31, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain provided Poland with guarantees that Great Britain would enter the war if the country was subjected to “direct or indirect aggression.”
In 1939, Hitler planned to unite the territories inhabited by the Germans into a single whole. To do this, it was necessary to take away part of the Polish territory between the two parts of Germany and annex Danzig. Poland did not agree to this, since Germany promised compensation at the expense of the USSR, but in the future. And she demanded territorial concessions right now. Under these conditions, Poland preferred guarantees from Great Britain and France. Hitler planned an attack on Poland at the end of August. But he feared a war on two fronts and sought to negotiate either with Poland's senior allies or neutrality with the USSR.
Britain and France hoped to avoid being drawn into a war similar to the First World War. To do this, it was necessary to direct German aggression to the east. But German expansion had to be controlled, directed against the USSR. Great Britain and France did not want to give the east of Europe to Hitler's undivided control, so that this would not lead to his uncontrollable strengthening. Under these conditions, Poland was supposed to play the role of an instrument of the Entente in eastern Europe. At the same time, Great Britain did not exclude the possibility of reaching an agreement with Germany at the expense of Poland. But Hitler could not agree to an agreement with Great Britain on Chamberlain's terms.
The USSR sought to avoid a military clash with Germany, supported by Great Britain, France and Italy (which resulted from the Munich policy). To do this, it was necessary either to come to an agreement with Great Britain, France, Poland and, if possible, Romania on joint military actions against the aggressor, or to come to an agreement with Germany to direct its aggression against Great Britain and France.
Despite the fact that Great Britain preferred rapprochement with Germany rather than the USSR, the USSR with France rather than Germany, and Germany with Great Britain rather than the USSR, rapprochement gradually went in a different direction. All three forces sought to intimidate the partner by negotiating with his rival and thus extract concessions from him. These contacts, initiated by mid-level officials, created opportunities that only on August 11–19, 1939 led to Stalin's decision to agree to Hitler's rapprochement initiatives.
On April 1, the Spanish Republic fell, which meant the collapse of the Popular Front policy, closely linked to the policy of “collective security”.
On April 1, Hitler attacked in his public speech those who were “pulling chestnuts out of the fire” with the wrong hands. This was a repetition of an image from Stalin’s speech, but only in translations into Western European languages. Stalin condemned those who like to rake in the heat with the hands of others. This meant the British and French. This idea was reported to Hitler, and he decided to use Stalin’s passage to blackmail the West.
On April 17, the USSR put forward a counterproposal: “England, France and the USSR enter into an agreement among themselves for a period of 5–10 years with a mutual obligation to immediately provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.” The same assistance should be provided to “Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR, in the event of aggression against these states.”
On April 17, Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov visited the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry (Ribbentrop's first deputy) E. Weizsäcker. The reason was quite good: after the capture of Czechoslovakia, there remained an unresolved issue about Soviet military orders that were placed at the Czech Skoda factories. Now the factories have become German. Will the Germans do the work for which money is paid? Weizsäcker responded that the current political climate was not the best for resolving such issues, but the parties spoke in favor of improving relations in the future. According to the German researcher I. Fleischhauer, by this time Weizsäcker had already become imbued with Schnurre’s ideas. From his recording of the conversation “it is clear that the conversation was skillfully directed by the Secretary of State, and that Weizsäcker’s psychological state prompted him to give this conversation the character of a political breakthrough.” The German researcher concludes: “Weizsäcker’s revelations actually represented the first official step towards rapprochement with the USSR.”
On May 3, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. Litvinov resigned. Stalin needed a People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs who was less inclined to cooperate with France. After Litvinov’s resignation, arrests were made in the NKID (remember that this “trace” was also knocked out of Koltsov). V. Molotov combined the posts of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Replacing Litvinov with Molotov was Stalin's choice in favor of greater freedom of hand in maneuvering between the West and Germany. The USSR continued to look for an opportunity to conclude a pact with Great Britain and France, but due to Molotov's harshness and his overload with other matters, negotiations did not go any easier. Stalin hoped that Molotov would be more assertive in putting pressure on his partners than Litvinov, and this hope was justified. Molotov's assertiveness quickly led to a logical result - the negotiations reached a dead end. With the courteous Litvinov, movement in this direction would have been slower.
On May 5, the adviser of the Soviet embassy, G. Astakhov, came to K. Schnurre (again about the Skoda - the Germans declared their readiness to fulfill the Soviet order), and the conversation turned to changes in the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Schnurre reported: “Astakhov touched upon the removal of Litvinov and tried, without asking direct questions, to find out whether this event would lead to a change in our position towards the Soviet Union.”
Conversations between Astakhov and Schnurre became more frequent. Now there was something to discuss - both Skoda and big politics. On May 17, Schnurre reported: “Astakhov explained in detail that in matters of international politics there are no contradictions between Soviet Russia and Germany and therefore there are no reasons for friction between the two countries.”
On May 20, Molotov told the German Ambassador W. Schulenburg that there was no political basis for rapprochement between the two countries (returning Weizsäcker’s remark to the Germans). In Berlin the phrase was considered “mysterious.”
On May 23, at a meeting, the military told Hitler that in the event of a simultaneous war with Great Britain, France and the USSR, Germany would lose.
On May 27, Great Britain and France responded to Soviet proposals by agreeing to the idea of a military alliance. This cooled Moscow down to the “German game.” It seemed that they had already managed to scare the “collective security” partners.
On June 28, Schulenburg mentioned in a conversation with Molotov that Hitler himself approved of the rapprochement between the countries. Molotov told Schulenburg that it looked as if Germany was playing a political game with the USSR under the pretext of economic negotiations. The Kremlin remembered the failure of Schnurre’s January mission. Now the leaders of the USSR demanded economic benefits ahead. Molotov spoke about this meeting: “I recently had Schulenburg and also spoke about the desirability of improving relations. But I didn’t want to offer anything concrete or intelligible.”
On June 29, Hitler decided: “The Russians must be informed that from their position we have concluded that they make the question of the continuation of future negotiations dependent on our acceptance of the principles of our economic discussions with them as they were formulated in January. Since this basis is unacceptable to us, we are currently not interested in resuming economic negotiations with Russia.” Hitler, according to Weizsäcker, “feared that a refusal would follow from Moscow amid loud laughter” if they were to propose a rapprochement. The “rapprochement” ended before it began. However, this "sniffing" stage was of great importance. Channels were created through which negotiations could be resumed almost immediately without attracting the attention of the “world community.”
On June 6–7, the leaders of Great Britain and France adopted the Soviet draft treaty as a basis. Negotiations could begin. Molotov invited his colleagues Chamberlain and Daladier to come to the negotiations. For the sake of Hitler, they easily made such a journey. At worst, there would be enough foreign ministers. But London and Paris replied that only ambassadors would conduct negotiations.
It became known that Poland “does not want to be fourth, not wanting to give arguments to Hitler.” Poland's refusal to participate in the agreement excluded the transfer of Soviet troops to the site of probable aggression at the beginning of a future war. In the event of the defeat of Poland, the USSR could be drawn into a war in eastern Europe alone with Germany. As the later experience of the German-Polish war showed, Great Britain and France did not intend to provide active support to their eastern ally.
On May 19, Chamberlain declared in Parliament that he would “rather resign than enter into an alliance with the Soviets.” On June 8, Halifax stated in Parliament that Great Britain was ready for negotiations with Germany.
On June 14, W. Strang, head of the Central European Bureau of the British Foreign Office, arrived in Moscow, who was sent as an expert to assist Ambassador W. Seeds. But Strang, representing the Forrin office, looked like the head of the delegation. This is how he was perceived by the Kremlin. Such a low level of the representative of the British Foreign Office insulted the Soviet side and convinced that Great Britain’s intentions were not serious.
On July 12, Chamberlain admitted that the USSR was ready to conclude an agreement. This was a problem - they agreed too quickly, without scaring Hitler with the negotiations.
On July 9, Molotov introduced the Soviet definition of “indirect aggression.” This is a situation in which the “victim” state “agrees, with or without the threat of force from another power,” to carry out an action “which entails the use of the territory and forces of that state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties.” . The words “indirect aggression” were taken from the British guarantees to Poland. Indirect aggression meant what Hitler did with the Czech Republic - he did not attack this country, but forced it to capitulate under the threat of attack and provoked the secession of Slovakia. It would seem that there should have been no objections from the British regarding the term “indirect aggression”. But Molotov’s definition was too broad and made it possible to occupy any Eastern European country under the pretext of a German threat. However, it was important for Soviet leaders that the Baltic states did not become German satellites and were not used as a springboard for invasion. The negotiations have reached a dead end. In a telegram to his plenipotentiaries in Paris and London, Molotov called the negotiating partners “swindlers and swindlers” and made a pessimistic conclusion: “Apparently, there will be no sense in all these endless negotiations.”
On July 18, Molotov gave the command to resume consultations with the Germans on concluding an economic agreement.
On July 21, Goering's employee H. Wohlthat, who arrived in London for a meeting of the International Refugee Committee, was invited to consultations with Chamberlain's adviser G. Wilson and the Minister of Commerce R. Hudson. Wilson's plan, which he outlined to Wohlthat and the German ambassador Dirksen on August 3, envisaged the conclusion of a German-British non-aggression pact, which would absorb the system of guarantees given by Great Britain to the countries of Eastern Europe. The spheres of interest of the two countries in Europe would be delimited, and Hitler would be recognized as hegemony in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Agreements were also envisaged on armament levels, the settlement of Germany's colonial claims and the provision of a large loan to it. Wilson believed that “an agreement must be concluded between Germany and England; if it were considered desirable, it would, of course, be possible to involve Italy and France in it.” Munich composition, new horizons. When Wohlthat inquired to what extent Chamberlain shared these ideas, Wilson invited the German guest to go to the next office and get confirmation from the prime minister himself. Not having the authority to negotiate at such a high level, Wohlthat refused, but he conveyed everything he heard to the embassy and to his superiors.
On July 23, the British and French agreed to the Soviet proposal to simultaneously negotiate a political agreement and military issues. Molotov considered the development of a specific plan for joint military action against Germany to be a more important issue than even the definition of indirect aggression. If it is possible to agree on a plan to attack Germany, then its invasion of the Baltic states is unlikely to take place.
At the end of July, Schnurre received instructions from his superiors to meet with Soviet representatives and resume consultations on improving Soviet-German relations. Schnurre invited Astakhov (due to Merekalov’s departure, he became Charge d’Affaires of the USSR in Germany) and Deputy Soviet Trade Representative E. Babarin (the representative was also on vacation at that time) to dinner. In the informal setting of the restaurant, Schnurre outlined the stages of a possible rapprochement between the two countries: the resumption of economic cooperation through the conclusion of credit and trade agreements, then the “normalization and improvement of political relations,” including the participation of officials in each other’s cultural events, then the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries or a return to the neutrality treaty of 1926, that is, to the “Rappal” times. Schnurre formulated a principle that his superiors would then repeat: “In the entire region from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea and the Far East, in my opinion, there are no insoluble foreign policy problems between our countries.” In addition, Schnurre developed his thought, “there is one common element in the ideology of Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union: opposition to capitalist democracies... Communism in Germany has been eradicated... Stalin postponed the world revolution indefinitely.” The Soviet interlocutors diplomatically did not object. They also did not know Stalin's indefinite deadlines. Agreeing with the need to improve relations, Soviet diplomats clarified that because of the previous mistrust, “one can only expect a gradual change.” Convincing his superiors of the profitability of this situation, Astakhov proposed to “draw the Germans into far-reaching negotiations” in order to “keep a trump card that could be used if necessary.” At first, Molotov was cautious, telegraphing Astakhov: “By limiting yourself to listening to Schnurre’s statements and promising that you would convey them to Moscow, you did the right thing.” But getting a “trump card” in the game with the West, and at the same time bargaining for economic benefits from Germany, was tempting. And Molotov, after consulting with Stalin, sent a new telegram to Astakhov: “Between the USSR and Germany, of course, with the improvement of economic relations, political relations can also improve. In this sense, Schnurre, generally speaking, is right... If now the Germans are sincerely changing the milestones and really want to improve political relations with the USSR, then they are obliged to tell us how they specifically imagine this improvement... The matter here depends entirely on the Germans. We would, of course, welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries.” The leaders of the USSR had no sympathy for Nazism, but were ready to treat Germany in the same way as their unreliable partners in Western Europe.
Astakhov was received by Ribbentrop. The German minister presented the Soviet representative with an alternative: “If Moscow takes a negative position, we will know what is happening and how to act. If the opposite happens, then from the Baltic to the Black Sea there will be no problems that we together cannot resolve among ourselves.”
On August 5, the Allied mission slowly boarded the ship (it’s not like flying by plane) and arrived in the USSR on August 11. What's the hurry? The composition of the military delegation also did not impress the Soviet side, which nominated People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov for negotiations. The French were represented by Brigadier General J. Doumenc. The English delegation was headed by the king's adjutant and head of the naval base in Portsmouth, Admiral R. Drake, a man very far from strategic issues, but sharply critical of the USSR. Air Marshal C. Barnett was supposed to compensate for Drax's incompetence, but he knew little about ground operations. The British delegation was instructed to move slowly, skip political negotiations ahead, and give as little information as possible. Dumenko was recommended to act according to circumstances in contact with the British, but also to listen more than to report.
Military negotiations in Moscow, which, as it seemed to Molotov, could break the deadlock in political negotiations with the allies, reached a dead end due to the problem of the passage of troops through Poland. As with the political negotiations, the focus was on the Czechoslovak experience. In 1938, the USSR was ready to provide assistance to the victim of aggression, but the Red Army could not enter the battlefield. At that time Poland was part of the pro-German coalition. Maybe things will be different now? No, the Poles firmly stood up to defend their borders against the USSR. Polish commander-in-chief E. Rydz-Smigly stated: “Regardless of the consequences, not a single inch of Polish territory will ever be allowed to be occupied by Russian troops.” “The military meeting soon failed due to the refusal of Poland and Romania to let Russian troops through,” U recalls sadly. Churchill. - Poland’s position was as follows: “With the Germans we risk losing our freedom, and with the Russians our soul” (phrase of Marshal Rydz-Smigly). The situation with Poland was extremely dangerous for the USSR. A simple combination followed: Germany attacks Poland and defeats it. Great Britain, France and the USSR declare war on Germany. After this, the French and British hover around the German Siegfried defensive line, and the main battles unfold on the eastern front. After all the combinations of pacification, such a strategic trap seemed most likely. In fact, Poland fell into it just a month later.
On August 11, Stalin, having discussed the current situation at the Politburo, gave the go-ahead to strengthen contacts with Germany. He needed to stimulate his Western partners in this way. Let the allies know that they must hurry.
On August 14, Astakhov informed Schnurre that Molotov agreed to discuss improving relations and even the fate of Poland. Astakhov emphasized that “the emphasis in his instructions is on the word “gradually.”
On August 15, Ambassador Schulenburg received instructions from Ribbentrop to invite the Soviet side to accept a visit from a major German leader in the near future. This proposal should have been read to Molotov, but not given into his hands. If the case fails, the enemy should not receive the papers.
After listening to this proposal, Molotov agreed that speed was needed in this matter.
On August 17, Molotov told Schulenburg: “The Soviet government takes note of the statement of the German government about its real desire to improve political relations between Germany and the USSR...” But what followed was a list of past grievances. However, “since the German government is now changing its previous policy,” it must first prove the seriousness of its intentions and conclude economic agreements: allocating a loan of 200 million marks to the Soviet Union for seven years (no one will remember about it in 1946), supply of valuable equipment. First - contracts, then - everything else. But the next step is to conclude a non-aggression pact or confirm the old neutrality treaty of 1926. And, finally, the most delicious thing: “with the simultaneous signing of a protocol that will determine the interests of the signatory parties in a particular foreign policy issue and which will be an integral part of the pact.” . In this protocol, everything can be stipulated, including the attitude towards Poland, for which the Germans fenced the whole garden. Less than two weeks remained before the planned German attack on Poland. But there was no talk about the division of spheres of influence and the secrecy of the protocol.
Despite the cool and arrogant tone of the Soviet statement, the ice continued to melt. Molotov was pleased with the Germans' proposal to send not a minor official, like the British, but a minister.
The minister himself immediately sent Schulenburg to Molotov again, this time with a draft pact, simple to the point of primitiveness: “The German state and the USSR undertake under no circumstances to resort to war and to refrain from any violence against each other.” The second point provided for the immediate entry into force of the pact and its long life - 25 years. The USSR and Germany were not supposed to fight until 1964. In a special protocol (there was no talk about secrecy), Ribbentrop proposed to carry out “coordination of spheres of interests in the Baltic, the problems of the Baltic states,” etc. This was the first time the topic of “delimitation of spheres” was heard from Ribbentrop’s mouth interests” (formula borrowed from G. Wilson). But so far it’s completely vague.
Appearing to Molotov, Schulenburg received another answer: if economic agreements are signed today, then Ribbentrop can arrive in a week - on August 26 or 27. It was too late for the Germans - just these days they planned to attack Poland. In addition, Molotov was surprised by the amateurishly drawn up draft of the pact. Soviet statesmen, who have already moved far from their revolutionary youth, are accustomed to working more solidly. They suggested that the Germans take one of the already concluded pacts as a basis and draw up a draft as expected, with several articles adopted in diplomatic terms. To Schulenburg’s proposal to move up the dates of Ribbentrop’s visit, “Molotov objected that even the first stage - the completion of economic negotiations - had not yet been completed.” It was three o'clock in the afternoon on August 19, 1939.
Half an hour passed, and Schulenburg was called to Molotov again. Clearly something happened. It turns out that after the meeting with the ambassador, Molotov had the opportunity to make a report to the “Soviet government.” Probably, we are talking not only about Stalin, but also about the Politburo, with whose members Stalin discussed the new situation: Western partners continue to play appeasement and lead the USSR by the nose, while the Nazis offer lasting peace and almost an alliance. It is impossible to delay any further; Nazi Germany is about to attack Poland. It's time to somehow decide.
At the second meeting with Molotov on August 19, Schulenburg received a draft non-aggression pact, drawn up according to all the rules of diplomatic science. There was only one thing missing - the usual indication for the “Litvinov’s” pacts that the document loses force in the event of aggression by one of the parties against a third state. Stalin and Molotov understood perfectly well why Hitler needed the pact. But they also knew that Great Britain and France were pushing Hitler east, that they had surrendered their ally Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and that Poland had recently discussed joint action with Germany against the USSR.
That same evening, Soviet diplomats received orders not to slow down economic negotiations.
On the night of August 20, a trade and credit agreement was signed. The USSR received 200 million marks, with which it could buy German equipment and pay off debts with supplies of raw materials and food.
On 20 August, Hitler, risking his prestige, sent a personal message to Stalin to encourage his new partner to accept Ribbentrop on 22 or 23 August. In his letter, Hitler accepted the Soviet draft pact and warned his colleague about the impending clash between Germany and Poland - there was little time left.
If Stalin had rejected the rapprochement, Hitler had a different foreign policy strategy in reserve.
“On August 21, London was asked to receive Goering on August 23 for negotiations, and Moscow - Ribbentrop to sign a non-aggression pact. Both the USSR and England agreed,” writes historian M.I. Meltyukhov. Hitler chose the USSR, canceling Goering's flight on August 22 (in London, this trouble became known only after the signing of the Soviet-German Pact).
Having received Hitler's letter, Stalin gave the command to Voroshilov, and on August 21 he read a statement to the Western military missions, which stated that negotiations could be resumed as soon as the issue of allowing troops through the territory of Poland and Romania was resolved.
Since Poland, with its disagreement on the passage of troops, blocked military negotiations in Moscow, the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance in the near future became impossible.
On 21 August, Stalin thanked Hitler for the letter, expressed hope that the pact would be "a turning point in the improvement of political relations between our countries", and agreed to Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August. This day was destined to become historic.
When Hitler learned that Ribbentrop could go to Moscow on August 23, he exclaimed: “This is one hundred percent victory! And although I never do this, now I will drink a bottle of champagne!”
Hitler said on August 22 that he was now afraid of only one thing: that “at the last moment some bastard will propose a mediation plan.” This meant Chamberlain.
If we consider the history of the diplomatic game of the end of 1938 - 1939 “step by step”, it is obvious that the three European centers - Germany, the USSR and the Entente - found themselves at an equal distance from each other. Each side tried to solve its problems by using one side against the other. The British calculation was based on the fact that Hitler could come to an agreement with Great Britain but could not with the USSR, the French calculation was based on the fact that Stalin could come to an agreement with Great Britain and France, but not with Hitler. Hitler's calculation was that the West would not decide to go to war, and therefore an agreement with Stalin was more important. If at the end of 1938 - the first half of 1939, the proposals of German officials to begin rapprochement with the USSR did not receive sufficient progress, then in July Germany began to persistently seek the conclusion of a Soviet-German pact. Stalin's calculation was based on the contradictions between two groups of imperialists. An agreement can be concluded with those who will give more for the USSR. Stalin knew very well what the alternative to the Soviet-German Pact was. Anglo-German Pact.
How to divide Europe?
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact does not paint Stalin's political biography. Hitler is the enemy of humanity, and Stalin divides Europe with him. Not good. An ideal event for myth-making. Stalin, therefore, is Hitler's accomplice in starting the Second World War. Even in textbooks you can now read that secret protocols provided for the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR and the seizure of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union. However, this version needs, to put it mildly, clarification.
On August 23, arriving in Moscow, Ribbentrop received a cool reception, but at a very high level. Stalin personally participated in the negotiations, who did not support conversations about the “spirit of brotherhood” of the two peoples, but busily bargained.
The Soviet side accepted the German amendments to the draft pact, except for the pompous preamble about friendship.
In its final form, the pact provided:
“Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.”
“In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the Other Contracting Party will not support that power in any form.” The Germans corrected the Soviet project so that it did not matter who initiated the war.
Article 3 provided for mutual consultation on issues of mutual interest. Article 4 effectively annulled the Anti-Comintern Pact: “Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.” After this, the Anti-Comintern Pact had to be replaced by the Tripartite Pact, which was concluded in 1940. But the military convention of the USSR with Great Britain and France also became impossible.
Article 5 provided for commissions to settle disputes and disagreements. At the insistence of the Germans, the wording about a “friendly” exchange of views was included. At the proposal of the Germans, the agreement was concluded for 10 years and was supposed to come into effect immediately. As you can see, there is nothing criminal. This pact was ratified, entered into force and had legal consequences - until June 22, 1941.
Then the parties began dividing spheres of influence. Ribbentrop proposed a line west of the Curzon Line (declared the border of ethnic Poland in 1919), beyond which German troops did not intend to go in the event of war. The territory east of this line was recognized as the sphere of interests of the USSR. Ribbentrop suggested that the USSR control the fate of Finland and Bessarabia. It was decided to divide the Baltic states into spheres of interest: Estonia (the most dangerous direction of a possible attack on Leningrad) - the Soviet Union, Lithuania - Germany. A controversy has erupted over Latvia. Ribbentrop tried to “recapture” Libau and Vindava into the German sphere of influence, but these ports were needed by the Soviet Union, and Stalin knew that the agreement was more valuable to Hitler than the two ports and all of Latvia in addition. And so the Soviet sphere of influence was smaller than the possessions of the Russian Empire. Hitler did not become stubborn and gave up Latvia, informing Ribbentrop of his decision in Moscow.
However, if Stalin insisted on other demands, Hitler was ready to give in “right up to Constantinople and the straits.”
The secret protocol provided:
"1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line dividing the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania’s interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both parties.” It follows from this phrase that we are not talking about eliminating the statehood of the listed countries.
"2. In the event of territorial and political transformations in areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the line of the Narev, Vistula and San rivers.
The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of both Parties to maintain the independence of the Polish state, and the boundaries of such a state, will only be finally decided by the course of future political events.
In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue through friendly agreement.” And this does not yet speak of the complete liquidation of the Polish state.
Germany's concessions in the Balkans were limited to the USSR's return of Bessarabia, which it already considered illegally occupied by Romania.
"3. Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side has clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.”
After the signing of the documents, a weight was lifted from the shoulders of the negotiating participants - failure of the meeting would mean a strategic failure for both sides. The conversation went much more friendly.
During the conversation with Ribbentrop, “Stalin and Molotov made hostile comments on the behavior of the British military mission in Moscow, which had never told the Soviet government what it really wanted.” Ribbentrop, supporting the anti-English theme that was valuable to him, said that “England is weak and wants others to support her arrogant claims to world domination. Mister Stalin readily agreed with this... England still dominates the world... thanks to the stupidity of other countries, which always allowed themselves to be deceived. It is ridiculous, for example, that only a few hundred British rule India... Stalin further expressed the opinion that England, despite its weakness, would wage the war deftly and stubbornly.”
Talking to Ribbentrop, Stalin said that “there is a limit to his patience with Japanese provocations. If Japan wants war, it can have it." This was a signal for Tokyo, and it was heard there, especially since, coupled with the defeat of the 6th Japanese Army at Khalkhin - Gol, Stalin’s words sounded especially convincing. The command of the Kwantung Army, which allowed the operation, was removed.
Ribbentrop stated that "the Anti-Comintern Pact was in general directed not against the Soviet Union, but against the Western democracies." He even joked: “Stalin will still join the Anti-Comintern Pact.” It was a probe. In a year this possibility will be discussed more seriously.
Toasts at the banquet regarding the success of the event also played an important role. Stalin said: “I know how much the German nation loves its leader, and therefore I would like to drink to his health.” Molotov and Ribbentrop drank to Stalin, and the Soviet premier specifically emphasized that the current change in the international situation began with Stalin’s speech at the congress, “which was correctly understood in Germany.” Molotov then developed this idea: “T. Stalin hit the nail on the head, exposing the machinations of Western European politicians who were trying to pit Germany and the Soviet Union against each other.” Now that the deed was done, it was possible, in order to praise the Leader, to interpret in this way a passage from Stalin’s speech about inter-imperialist contradictions. During the conversation, Stalin showed Ribbentrop that he was well aware of the German-British negotiations. When the minister mentioned another probe from the British, Stalin said: “We are apparently talking about Chamberlain’s letter, which Ambassador Henderson presented to the Fuhrer in Obersalzberg on August 23.”
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed on the night of August 24, 1939 (the official date of its signing is considered to be the day the negotiations began - August 23).
This date has become one of the milestones in world history, and disputes about the Pact divide historians, and educated people in general, by ideological barriers. For some, the Pact is a necessary measure to protect the country from Hitler’s attack: “The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty helped strengthen security not only on the western borders of the USSR, but also led to the stabilization of the situation on the eastern borders of the country.” I am deliberately quoting a monograph that was published not in 1947 or 1977, but in 1997.
For others, the Pact is a crime that doomed the peoples of Europe to be divided between two totalitarian regimes. According to a typical assessment expressed by S.Z. Incidentally, the Pact “gave the aggressor complete freedom of action,” and in the secret protocol “recorded an agreement between the two aggressive states on territorial and political reorganization and division of spheres of interests in Eastern Europe, the first victim of which was to be Poland.”
Summing up the conclusion of the Pact between the USSR and Germany, Churchill asserts that “only totalitarian despotism in both countries could decide on such an odious unnatural act.” The politician here clearly prevailed over the historian, as often happens in Churchill's narrative. He “forgot” that just a year earlier the states of the West, which Churchill did not at all consider totalitarian and despotic, committed an even more “odious and unnatural act” in Munich.
Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, it is already possible to emerge from the captivity of the ideological battles of the mid-century and look at the pre-war period with a calmer look. How do we judge the Napoleonic wars, which did not interfere with the development of Soviet-French relations in the second half of the 20th century? This was in the last century. A calm look will help you more accurately assess the logic of events, which is necessary so as not to repeat history as a new tragedy.
First of all, the question arises: did the Pact predetermine the division of Eastern Europe? I. Fleischhauer, with her usual scientific meticulousness, proposes to draw a “distinction between the legitimate interest of the Soviet side in achieving a (defensive) non-aggression agreement, on the one hand, and actual entry into an (offensive in its consequences) alliance with the aim of dividing (by military means) the spheres of political influence - on the other." If we separate these concepts, then Stalin agreed to the first on August 19 (four days before the signing of the pact), and to the second - after the start of the German-Polish war, when it became clear that Great Britain and France did not provide effective assistance to allied Poland, dooming it to defeat This was already a new situation compared to August 23. When concluding a pact with Germany, Stalin had to take into account the various possibilities that flowed from it. A German-Polish agreement could have taken place under pressure from Great Britain and France, a new Munich with the participation of the USSR. After the German attack on Poland, an effective offensive could have begun on the western front at the time of the German attack on Poland, which would have pulled Hitler's forces to the west and saved the Poles from quick defeat. Each of these options was more beneficial to the USSR than the situation in July and especially March 1939, and it was not excluded at all by the Pact.
Based on the multivariate nature of events, M.I. Meltyukhov believes: “As for the secret protocol to the Soviet-German Pact, this document is also quite amorphous in nature. It does not record any anti-Polish agreements between the parties... As we see, the entire “anti-Polish” content of the document consists of endless reservations - “if only” and abstract concepts of “sphere of interests”, “territorial and political reorganization”. In any case, the Soviet-German agreement did not provide for any real territorial changes or occupation of “spheres of interest.” This is, of course, not true. The anti-Polish agreements were recorded at least by the fact that demarcation lines were drawn across the territory of Poland. But we can agree with M.I. Meltyukhov, that non-specificity is the fundamental difference between the Soviet-German Pact and the Munich Pact. But the concept of “sphere of interests” meant the USSR’s use of methods of colonial diplomacy familiar to Great Britain, France and Germany. It is true that the Pact left Hitler open to both military and Munich solutions. But all these decisions (including those that could have been taken together with the USSR and Great Britain) were anti-Polish. The pact closed the possibility of German-Polish rapprochement at the expense of the USSR. But by doing this, he made inevitable the reduction of the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, “territorial and political reorganization,” which in no way corresponded to its interests.
Trying to protect the USSR from accusations of aggressive intentions, V.Ya. Sipols states: “the USSR did not lay claim to any sphere of interests in Poland.” Here's your time! But this is directly written down in the protocol. According to V.Ya. Sipols, Stalin was forced to accept Nazi formulations because there was no time to redo them. As we have seen, the negotiators had enough time not only to agree on numerous formulations, but also to thoroughly bargain over areas of interest that were not “claimed” by the USSR.
From the very beginning of the existence of the Bolshevik dictatorship, it, like any bureaucratic dictatorship, was concerned with expanding its “sphere of influence,” even if this sphere extended to the formally independent Mongolia or the territory of China or Spain occupied by unreliable allies. In this respect, the USSR differed from Great Britain in its smaller scope, and from Germany in its less cynicism. But both gradually came with the growth of the military-industrial power of the communist bureaucracy. The pact allowed the USSR to enter the circle of “great powers” that controlled the destinies of Europe.
Was there an alternative to the Pact and what exactly was it? There are almost always alternatives in history. But not all of them lead to better consequences.
The Soviet powers insist that there is no alternative to the Pact. Liberal-Western literature proves the possibility of continuing negotiations on the Anglo-Franco-Soviet union. As we have seen, the success of these negotiations was impossible in the days remaining before Hitler's planned attack on Poland. Chamberlain, in fact, blocked rapprochement with the USSR.
M.I. Semiryaga offers three alternatives to the Pact. The first way: delaying negotiations with Germany while continuing negotiations with the British and French. We saw that this was fraught, first of all, with an Anglo-German agreement or the involvement of the USSR in a German-Polish clash without the possibility of providing Poland with effective assistance in the first days of the war (and then this would push the USSR into the strategic trap described above). The second way: if Great Britain, France and Poland would not agree to a reasonable compromise with the USSR, still conclude an agreement with Germany, including in it the right to annul the agreement in the event of German aggression against a third country. But what does “if” have to do with it? Poland was not going to change its position. Consequently, negotiations with Germany are proposed on terms that are unacceptable to it (why would Hitler need a pact that would be broken on September 1?). This is the same first way of “delaying”. Both first paths lead to the third path - do not enter into agreements with anyone. In this case, according to M.I. Semiryagi, “The Soviet Union would maintain a truly neutral status, gaining as much time as possible to better prepare for a future inevitable war.” This logic is strikingly reminiscent of the justifications of Soviet ideologists regarding the Pact. He helped delay the war. Only the Semiryagi option is obviously weaker, since it leaves ample opportunity for an anti-Soviet Anglo-German rapprochement at the expense of the USSR, a new Munich and with the full force of German aggression turning to the east. However, M.I. himself Semiryaga crosses out all three of his alternatives to the Pact with the following statement: “Of course, one could count on such alternative solutions only if one was confident that Germany, in the absence of an agreement with the USSR, would not attack Poland.” Obviously, no one could give such guarantees. But if Germany had not attacked Poland, it could have come to an agreement with the West, which would have been no better for the USSR. Thus, the reasoning of M.I. Semiryags in support of “alternatives” rather convince of the justification of the Pact.
There was an alternative to signing the Pact. But, as we have seen, this was not the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance. Before Germany attacked Poland there was no chance of this. And after the attack by the USSR, it was unprofitable to enter into a war that begins with the defeat of one of the allies. The USSR could remain neutral and not take part in the division of Poland. This meant a return to the foreign policy situation of 1927–1933. and the end of 1938, going on the defensive in anticipation of the clash of “imperialist predators” leading to revolutions. But in the first years of the war, nothing conducive to revolutions happened. Therefore, the “silent defense” strategy was very risky. The timing of the attack on the USSR was left to the enemy. The moment of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war could be postponed for several years - until Hitler dealt with France and Great Britain. And then the USSR would be left alone with fascist Europe and Japan united by Hitler, relying on the resources of China and India.
Stalin preferred another option, which stemmed from traditional European policy - participation in the partitions, strengthening his strategic positions before a future clash. The specificity of the 20th century was that the struggle was not just for the Polish or even French inheritance, but for the inheritance of the global market and the global system of colonial domination of the European powers. The fate of the whole world was at stake in the struggle of several bureaucracies, which became stronger as a result of industrial society reaching a state-monopoly level of development.
Did the Pact predetermine the outbreak of war in Europe?
Both Mussolini, Weizsäcker, and Schulenburg believed that the Pact would help achieve a new Munich. Now the British will become more accommodating. And the Poles have nothing to hope for. According to Weizsäcker, after the Pact, even Hitler “believes that the Poles will give in and again talks about a step-by-step solution. After the first stage, he believes, the British will refuse to support the Poles.” But the fascist leaders underestimated the self-confidence of Polish politicians. The Ambassador in Paris, J. Lukasiewicz, asserted: “It is not the Germans, but the Poles who will burst into the depths of Germany in the very first days of the war!”
Modern authors never cease to argue about the responsibility of the USSR for the start of the war. But very often the statements of the authors say more about them than about the situation in 1939. The statements that “the USSR sought to prevent the Second World War” are just as dictated by the ideology of the authors as the statement that “Stalin started the Second World War.” The first statement completely ignores the communist ideology to which Stalin was personally committed. For him, the war between the imperialists was a positive factor, since it weakened the enemy. It is important that the USSR is not drawn into war until the imperialists weaken each other. Already at the XVIII Congress it was calmly said that a new world war was already underway. At the same time, Stalin (unlike Chamberlain) perfectly understood the danger of Hitler’s expansion and preferred, until August 1939, to restrain it by all possible methods, including force. When the actions of the heroes of Munich showed Stalin that it would not be possible to prevent Hitler’s seizure of Poland, the leader of the USSR chose to isolate himself from Hitler’s expansion at least for a while. Whether there will be a war outside his sphere of influence or not is a matter for Hitler and Chamberlain. Hitler and Chamberlain preferred war, which did not upset Stalin, although he was not the initiator of this decision. It was necessary to develop our strategy in the face of the inevitable prospect of a clash with Hitler.
Great Britain and Germany continued to seek peace with Germany not only after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but also after they declared war on Germany on September 3. This explains their deception of the Polish allies. Promising that an Anglo-French offensive would begin that would crush Germany, the French limited themselves to maneuvers and took cover behind the Maginot Line. The French and English valued the lives of their compatriots too much to put them in danger.
A stab in the back or a liberation campaign?
We know that on September 17, the USSR intervened in the German-Polish war. The Poles repelled the blow of Hitler's aggression, and the Red Army struck the Polish Army in the rear. This is what predetermined Hitler's victory. The “fourth partition of Poland” was completed.
The answer to this is: nothing to worry about. Everything is fine. There was no Soviet aggression against Poland. There was a “liberation campaign,” or, in other words, a “peacekeeping operation.”
However, Stalin attached great importance to not interfering in the Second World War. Moreover, the Germans were not confident that the Soviet invasion of Poland would take place, since it was not directly provided for by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but only implied.
On September 3, Ribbentrop ordered Schulenburg to inform Molotov: “it is clear that for military reasons we will then have to act against those Polish military forces that by that time will be in Polish territories within the Russian sphere of influence.” It was important to find out “whether the Soviet Union would not consider it desirable for the Russian army to move at this moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, for its part, to occupy this territory.” For Germany, the USSR's attack on Poland in the first week of the war was extremely important. This could drag the USSR into a war against Great Britain and France, and at the same time deprive Poland of hopes for long-term resistance. In the face of a Soviet invasion, the Allies would not attack the Siegfried Line, and as a last resort it would be possible to quickly transfer Wehrmacht units from Poland to the west, ceding the honor of storming Warsaw to the Russians. Ribbentrop did not yet know that Poland's allies would not make any attempts to help her anyway, and Germany had nothing to fear.
However, Stalin was in no hurry to get his piece of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and thus reunite Belarus and Ukraine.
On September 7, in a conversation with leaders of the Comintern, Stalin characterized the conflict that had begun as a war between two groups of imperialist powers. Stalin spoke of Poland as a fascist state, which was no better than the Germany that attacked him. Hence the conclusion: “What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations.” The Cominternists had to not only intensify the fight against Western governments, but be ready in due time to intensify the fight against the Nazis. “We wouldn’t mind them having a good fight and weakening each other... Hitler, without knowing it, is frustrating and undermining the capitalist system.”
In order not to be drawn into a war of two blocs on the side of Germany, Stalin decided to wait for now, citing the unpreparedness of the Red Army: “The Red Army was counting on several weeks, which have now been reduced to several days,” Molotov explained to Schulenburg the delay in bringing Soviet troops into the “sphere” interests of the USSR." In fact, with the introduction of the law on universal conscription on September 1, the USSR could carry out unlimited mobilization. On September 6, 2.6 million people were called up in the western military districts. The concentration of Soviet troops was scheduled for September 11.
While there was no clarity with the position of the USSR, the German command was considering the option of creating a puppet Ukrainian state in the Soviet sphere of influence with the help of the OUN.
The USSR was also going to play the Ukrainian card (together with the Belarusian one), and in a way that was offensive to Germany. Molotov told Schulenburg: the Soviet government intends to declare “that Poland is falling apart and that as a result the Soviet Union must come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Belarusians who are “threatened” by Germany. This pretext will make the intervention of the Soviet Union seem plausible in the eyes of the masses and will enable the Soviet Union not to look like an aggressor.” It turned out that the USSR still considered Germany an aggressor. Under pressure from the Germans, the statement about the threat on their part had to be replaced with a pacifist thesis about the threat of war for the civilian population of Ukraine and Belarus.
When everything was ready for a strike from the east, on September 14, Pravda issued a programmatic article on the reasons for Poland’s defeat, where it exposed the oppressive policy of the Polish leadership towards national minorities. And the conclusion: “A multinational state, not bound by the bonds of friendship and equality of the peoples inhabiting it, but, on the contrary, based on the oppression and inequality of national minorities, cannot represent a strong military force.”
Subsequently, official propaganda will declare the last Soviet-Polish war a “peaceful liberation campaign.” But the troops who were preparing for the “peaceful campaign” had no illusions - a “revolutionary, just war” was ahead.
On September 16, the German pincers closed in at Brest, Poland was defeated. At the same time, a Soviet-Japanese agreement was concluded to resolve the border dispute at Khalkhin-Gol. Now Stalin decided that the time had come to get “his part” of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On September 7, the USSR army crossed the border. The Polish ambassador in Moscow was handed a note with an official explanation of Soviet actions: “Warsaw as the capital of Poland no longer exists. The Polish government has collapsed and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist.” In reality, the government continued to live and work in Kolomyia near the Romanian border. The arguments used were those introduced into diplomatic circulation by Chamberlain after the collapse of Czechoslovakia. If the state has collapsed, then the agreements with it are no longer valid: “Thereby, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland ceased to be valid.” This was the main thesis for the sake of which it was necessary to report the “disappearance” of the Polish government. Next, the key security motives for Soviet foreign policy propaganda came into force: “Left to itself and left without leadership, Poland turned into a convenient field for all sorts of accidents and surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR. Therefore, being hitherto neutral, the Soviet government cannot be more neutral in its attitude towards these facts.” This meant that the USSR was leaving the regime of neutrality, that is, in fact, entering the war. “The Soviet government cannot also be indifferent to the fact that half-blooded Ukrainians and Belarusians living on the territory of Poland, abandoned to the mercy of fate, remain defenseless.” “In view of this situation, the Soviet government ordered the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.” This was an important turn in Soviet ideology, which became a new stage in the long evolution from international to national priorities. If earlier the USSR planned to “liberate” and “protect” all peoples, now only those that already had their own territorial entities within the USSR. This emphasis does not fit into the myth that Stalin sought above all to restore the Russian Empire. It is important for Stalin to take Galicia, inhabited by Ukrainians, which was not part of the Russian Empire, but he will easily give up the Polish lands themselves, which were previously part of the Russian Empire. Stalin did not become a greater nationalist because of this, but was guided by pragmatic considerations. Divided nations are sources of conflict. So it is better to liberate them entirely (as the Poles would see in 1944–1945). In 1939, the ideological transition took place gradually, especially since part of the territories populated predominantly by Poles remained in the Soviet sphere of influence: “At the same time, the Soviet government intends to take all measures to rescue the Polish people from the ill-fated war into which they were plunged by their foolish leaders, and give him the opportunity to live a peaceful life.”
Speaking on the radio, Molotov argued even more harshly: “The Polish ruling circles have gone bankrupt... the population of Poland has been abandoned by its hapless leaders to the mercy of fate.”
The Soviet group entered Poland - 617 thousand soldiers and 4,736 tanks. It was then increased to 2.4 million people with 6096 tanks. Such an army could resist not only the Poles, but, if something happened, also the Germans.
“The political and military leadership of Poland did not expect open military intervention by the USSR.” For some time it was not even clear on which side the Soviet troops were going to act - the tank columns marched in marching order, the tankers sat on the towers with open hatches, greeting the population.
Rydz-Smigly gave the order: “The Soviets have invaded. I order the withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in the event of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves from the Germans, remains unchanged. Units approached by the Soviets must negotiate with them in order to withdraw garrisons to Romania or Hungary.”
General W. Anders believed that the Red Army struck “when we could still resist for some time and give the Allies the opportunity to strike at Germany’s open borders.” This point of view has become practically official in Poland. Responding to her supporters, Russian historian M.I. Meltyukhov writes: “Particularly “convincing” are the statements regarding the intentions of Poland’s Western allies, who did not lift a finger to help her even when the Polish Army was still a significant force, let alone in mid-September, when the Polish front collapsed? .. By September 17, the Wehrmacht not only defeated the main groups of the Polish Army, but also surrounded almost all combat-ready units... Of course, if the Red Army had not entered Poland, the Germans would have needed some time to occupy its eastern voivodeships, but there was no real stable front there could not have arisen,” says M.I. Meltyukhov.
Could the Poles resist? In the end, of course not. But the front in the southwest of the country, which Rydz-Smigly planned, could be created. This would have made a big difference if the Allies did hit the Germans. But, as we know today, they did not intend to do this. Therefore, Poland was doomed in any case.
But in September 1939, the Polish leadership did not know that their struggle was doomed. Therefore, the Soviet blow finally destroyed the deceptive hopes for long-term resistance and caused such bitterness among the direct participants in the events.
Further Polish resistance became pointless. Late in the evening of September 17, the Polish government left the country.
The Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts, covering the territory of the east of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the north and south, met disproportionately less resistance than the Germans from the weak Polish forces still remaining in this region. The Polesie group chose to avoid the collision and went to the West. There is a real, albeit hopeless, war there. Here - it is unclear what and also without a chance of success.
Only in a few places did serious clashes take place - near Vilna, Grodno, Kozhan-Gorodok, Krasne, Sutkowice (where the Reds were confronted by General W. Anders, the future commander of the USSR-allied Polish army, who fought on the side of the British). Lviv found itself under attack from two armies - German and Soviet. There was obvious rivalry between them. It got to the point that on September 19, Soviet troops found themselves under crossfire between Poles and Germans. The Germans explained this as a misunderstanding. On September 20, the German command gave the order to withdraw troops from Lvov, which was in the Soviet sphere of influence, but German officers persuaded the Poles to the last: “If you surrender Lvov to us, you will remain in Europe, if you surrender to the Bolsheviks, you will become Asia forever.”
In the city of Brest, although it was in the Soviet sphere, but which was occupied by the Germans, when the German troops were replaced by Soviet ones, a parade of these two armies was held.
The Ukrainian and Belarusian population, dissatisfied with the policies of the Polish government, took to the streets in droves, demonstrating joy at the arrival of the Red Army. Some residents, of course, were not happy, but did not protest. On September 20, during the storming of Grodno, the local population helped the Soviet troops.
On September 19, a Soviet-German communique was published, in which the USSR was forced to put its armed forces on the same level as the Wehrmacht: “The task of these troops ... is to restore order and tranquility in Poland, disturbed by the collapse of their own state, and to help the population of Poland reorganize the conditions of its state existence." The fourth partition of Poland, in a word. But Stalin would like to partition not Poland itself, but the multinational Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - to separate areas inhabited by Poles from areas inhabited by Belarusians and Ukrainians. Schulenburg was informed about this on September 19. On September 25, Stalin personally explained his motives to Schulenburg. The division of the Polish population itself could cause friction between the USSR and Germany. Therefore, it is possible to exchange the Polish part of the Soviet sphere of influence up to the Vistula for Lithuania.
Stalin kept silent about other motives. Without claiming to seize part of Poland, Stalin skillfully evaded accusations of aggression. The aggression was committed by Germany, and the USSR simply took under protection the peoples, most of whom live in the USSR. The Soviet Union is not making an attempt on the Poles. No oppression. The initial inclusion of part of Poland into the Soviet sphere of influence was necessary for Stalin in case events led to the preservation of Poland within reduced borders. Then this state would be dependent on both Germany and the USSR. Now such a need had disappeared, and Hitler could receive the laurels of the conqueror of Poland in full and with all the ensuing international consequences. Stalin's calculation turned out to be correct. Western countries chose not to consider the USSR an aggressor.
On September 28, Warsaw fell. On this day, Germany and the USSR entered into an agreement on friendship and borders. The parties proclaimed their desire to ensure “peace and order”, “peaceful coexistence of peoples” and divided the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth along a new line. Ribbentrop, who arrived in Moscow, received a warmer welcome than before, but bargaining continued for a long time. The stumbling block was the areas of Suwałki, the lower reaches of the San River and the Augustow Forests. The Germans needed timber and oil fields. Stalin referred to the fact that the territories were “promised to the Ukrainians.” In the end, they agreed to cut the disputed area of the Augustow Forests in half. But the border in this place turned out to be very intricate. Since the Lithuanian territories of the Vilna region, occupied by Poland in 1920, were now transferred to Lithuania, they decided to cut off a small piece of Lithuanian territory in favor of Germany to straighten the border. Later, when the USSR became the patron of Lithuania, Soviet diplomacy did its best to delay the fulfillment of this promise, so as not to hurt the national feelings of the Lithuanians. In 1941, the USSR managed to resolve this issue by purchasing the “disputed” Lithuanian territory. And in September 1939, all of Lithuania “by exchange” fell into the Soviet sphere of influence.
The agreement excluded the intervention of third countries in deciding the fate of Poland. This concerned primarily Great Britain and France, who were still “fighting” on the side of Poland, although almost without firing shots. On September 29, a joint statement was published by the Soviet and German governments, which tied the USSR even more closely to Germany in confrontation with Western countries: “The elimination of a real war between Germany on the one hand and England and France on the other hand would meet the interests of all peoples.” If Germany and the USSR cannot persuade the West to agree to peace, then “the fact will be established that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war...”.
The results of the Soviet-Polish war of 1939 and the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Border still live on today - within the borders of the united Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. There are no legal grounds for overturning these results - they were confirmed by agreements concluded after World War II. The results of World War II wrote off all the sins of the victors and their heirs, which are the former republics of the USSR.
When the deed was done, Molotov spoke on September 31 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: “It turned out that a short blow to Poland, first from the German army, and then from the Red Army, was enough for nothing to remain of this ugly brainchild of the Versailles Treaty, which lived off the oppression of non-Polish nationalities." Thus, Molotov accepted the responsibility of the Red Army for the destruction of the Polish state. It is not surprising that the USSR gradually shifted from an equidistant position relative to the two warring coalitions towards the German side.
Molotov explained to the Soviet people: “Over the past few months, such concepts as “aggression”, “aggressor” have received new specific content and acquired a new meaning. It is not difficult to guess that now we cannot use these concepts in the same sense as, say, 3-4 months ago. Now, if we talk about the great powers of Europe, Germany is in the position of a state striving for a speedy end to the war and for peace, while England and France, which only yesterday stood up against aggression, stand for the continuation of the war and against the conclusion of peace. The roles, as you can see, are changing.”
Molotov’s “dialectical” reasoning is easily explained - the USSR easily fell under the old definition of an aggressor. Indeed, can the Soviet Union be considered an aggressor? Was there even a war? These questions are still controversial.
V. Sipols supports the traditional point of view of the CPSU that there was simply “the liberation of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands seized by Poland in 1920.” The word “liberation” in relation to these events is a purely ideological rudiment of the era of the Second World War. The residents of the “liberated” territories did not receive any additional freedom; they moved from the jurisdiction of one authoritarian state to the jurisdiction of another - a totalitarian one. Political oppression has become stronger, national oppression has weakened somewhat. Something similar happened in 1920, when Poland received its share during the division of the Russian Empire. Most of the boundaries that have existed from ancient times to the present day were drawn by force of arms. The word “liberation” in force actions of this kind symbolizes the triumph of one or another principle that is shared by the “liberator”. If earlier the Red Army understood by “liberation” primarily the overthrow of the capitalist system, then the national principle prevailed in ideology. Territories are “liberated” in favor of the Soviet Union because “consanguineous” residents live there.
In 1944–1945 the concept of “liberation” will again become international (up to the liberation of the Germans by the Red Army). For Stalin, this was a matter of principle.
The opposite “power”, but also ideologically driven point of view, is defended by those authors who claim that since September 1939, the USSR participated in the Second World War on the side of Germany. If the basis for such a conclusion were the participation of the USSR in the German-Polish war, then there would be reasons for their statement, but the participation of the USSR in the war would have to be considered as having ceased with the defeat of Poland. After all, the war was going on de facto, not de jure. Great Britain and France did not consider that the USSR entered their war with Germany in September 1939. Therefore, to confirm this ideological concept, it is necessary to prove that the USSR was a participant in the war in 1940. Here, supporters of the “military version” have much more difficulty with the facts. They propose to consider the USSR a participant in the war already due to the fact that it provided “aid” to Germany, which was expressed primarily in trade. But then Sweden (on the side of Germany), Finland (first on the side of Great Britain, and then Germany from the beginning of 1941), the USA and almost all countries of Latin America (on the side of Great Britain) will have to immediately be declared participants in the war. All of them traded with the warring parties, provided one or another military-technical support, although they did not send their soldiers to war and did not break off diplomatic relations with their friend’s enemy.
Participation in war is recorded either legally (declaration of war) or through the open participation of troops in hostilities. The rest is scholasticism.
The USSR struck a blow at the Polish state when its death was already a foregone conclusion. As a result of the division of the Polish state, the USSR included territories populated mainly by Ukrainians and Belarusians. Great Britain and France did not regard the actions of the USSR as interference in their war with Germany. If we remain on the basis of historical science, the USSR entered the world war on June 22, 1941.
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Books
- Lend-Lease. Roads to Russia. US military supplies to the USSR in World War II 1941-1945, Robert Jones. History professor Robert Jones devoted his work to Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union during World War II. The author conducted a study of published official and unofficial…
- Lend-Lease Roads to Russia US military supplies to the USSR in World War II 1941-1945, Jones R.. Professor-historian Robert Jones devoted his work to Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union during World War II. The author conducted a study of published official and unofficial…
- Lend-Lease. Roads to Russia. US military supplies to the USSR in World War II. 1941-1945, Robert Jones. History professor Robert Jones devoted his work to Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union during World War II. The author conducted a study of published official and unofficial…
image) The USSR entered the Second World War not in 1941, but in 1939, on the side of Germany, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocol to it were signed.
When did the USSR enter World War II? I would very much like to answer this question clearly and clearly, like in a Soviet school: June 22, 1941. Yes, even to add a five: as a victim of the aggression of the Nazi invaders. But it doesn't work.
A fragment of a map from the Geographical Atlas of the USSR for secondary schools, signed for printing 18/I - 1941 - 5/II - 1941 and published in a circulation of 200,000 copies. Poland is no longer on the map. It is divided between the USSR and Germany. There is no Warsaw either - only Krakow, where the German General Government was located, managing the “Area of German State Interests” (circled in red)
After the signing of a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on August 23, 1939 - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Secret Additional Protocol (on the division of Europe, and especially Poland), the USSR was already preparing for war and not as a victim. And when World War II began on September 1, 1939, with the invasion of Poland by German troops, the Soviet Union began to actively help the aggressor.
The radio station in Minsk acted as a beacon to guide German aircraft to targets in Poland. Violating the international blockade, the USSR sold strategic raw materials to Germany, sometimes even buying them from other countries.
And finally, on September 17, 1939, the Red Army entered Poland - not at all to help repel Hitler's aggression, quite the contrary - in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Secret Additional Protocol and in violation of the non-aggression treaty with Poland concluded in 1932 and extended in 1934.
But even before September 17, the Stalinist regime provided military assistance to Hitler. This is what historian Sergei Sluch found out (see, unfortunately, the magazine “Domestic History”, little known to the general reader, No. 5, 6, 2000).
The High Command of the German Navy “literally from the very first days of the war (beginning of September 1939 - O.Kh.) decided to use the advantages arising from the “benevolent neutrality” of the USSR, and, involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, secured the consent of the Soviet leadership for the use of Murmansk port as a transshipment point for German cargo sent further by rail to Leningrad, from where they, in turn, were sent to the ports of the Third Reich (see telegram from the deputy head of the political and economic department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. Kloudis to the German embassy in Moscow, September 6, 1939 // ADAP, D, BD. VIII, Dok. 15, S. 12.).
The anti-British interaction of the two powers at sea was especially convincingly manifested in the story of the “Nord Base” on the Kola Peninsula. The Kriegsmarine was given West Litsa Bay, in which the Reich Navy "could do what it wanted and was allowed to carry out any intentions it deemed necessary" (KTB SKL, Teil A, Bd. 2 S. 136, entry dated 17 October 1939).
At the same time, the entry of German warships of all types into this bay was authorized. The decision to provide it was due to the Kremlin’s concerns about the “insufficient isolation” of Murmansk from prying eyes and was undoubtedly “an act of a truly belligerent party” (Philbin T. R. Op. Cit. P. 82).
As we see, not only mutual hostility towards Poland, but also towards Great Britain united the two totalitarian regimes. And the Soviet Union entered World War II not even on September 17, when the Red Army crossed the borders of Poland and captured Polish military personnel, but somewhat earlier - when it entered into cooperation with the German Navy “against England.”
And yet, the USSR fired its first shots in World War II in Poland. They were a direct consequence of the Secret Additional Protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentorop Pact.
We publish the protocol itself and some documents that followed it based on the book by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Felshtinsky “Subject to Disclosure: USSR - Germany 1939-1941 (Documents and Materials).” (M., Moscow worker, 1991).
In the preface to the book, its compiler writes: “The collection is based on two types of sources. The first is the diplomatic documents of the German Foreign Office. In 1948 they were published in German and English by the US State Department. All diplomatic documents used in this collection are taken from this US government publication. In addition to this, the collection includes some materials published in the Pravda newspaper. They<...>illustrate the openly pro-Nazi policy pursued by the Soviet government at that time... Translations of all documents were made by the compiler.”
Pay attention to the telegrams published in Soviet newspapers that were exchanged between temporary allies and victors Stalin, Hitler and Ribbentrop in December 1939. They are unlikely to be shown to our schoolchildren in the coming years, and even excellent students will never be able to correctly answer the question of when the Soviet Union entered the Second World War.
Secret additional protocol
When signing the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both parties discussed in strictly confidential manner the issue of delimiting areas of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to the following result.
In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.
In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the Narev, Vistula and Sana rivers.
The question whether the preservation of an independent Polish state is desirable in mutual interests and what the boundaries of this state will be can only be finally clarified during further political developments.
In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.
Regarding the southeast of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the USSR's interest in Bessarabia.
The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.
This protocol will be kept strictly confidential by both parties. Moscow, August 23, 1939 By authority For the Government of Germany I. Ribbentrop Government of the USSR V. Molotov Record of Ribbentrop’s conversation with Stalin and Molotov State secret Office of the Reich Foreign Minister, August 24, 1939
Record of a conversation that took place on the night of August 23-24 between the Reich Foreign Minister, on the one hand, and Messrs. Stalin and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov, on the other hand
Toasts
During the conversation, Mr. Stalin unexpectedly proposed a toast to the Fuhrer: “I know how much the German nation loves its Leader, and therefore I would like to drink to his health.”
Mister Molotov drank to the health of the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Count von Schulenburg.
Mr. Molotov raised a glass to Stalin, noting that it was Stalin who completely changed political relations with his speech in March of this year, which was correctly understood in Germany.
Messrs. Molotov and Stalin drank again to the Non-Aggression Pact, to a new era in German-Russian relations and to the German nation.
The Reich Foreign Minister, in turn, proposed a toast to Mr. Stalin, to the Soviet government and to the favorable development of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.
When parting, Mr. Stalin addressed the Reich Foreign Minister with the following words: “The Soviet government takes the new pact very seriously. He can give his word of honor that the Soviet Union will never betray its partner.”
Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg
Telegram
Telegram No. 253 dated September 3 Very urgent! Personally, the ambassador. Top secret! To the head of the embassy or his representative in person. Secret! Must be deciphered by him personally! Top secret!
We certainly hope to completely defeat the Polish army within a few weeks. Then we will keep under military occupation the areas which, as was established in Moscow, are within the German sphere of interest. However, it is clear that for military reasons we will then have to act against those Polish military forces that by that time will be located in Polish territories within the Russian sphere of interests.
Please discuss this with Molotov immediately and see if the Soviet Union would not consider it desirable for the Russian army to move at the appropriate moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for its part, occupy that territory. According to our considerations, this would not only help us, but also, in accordance with the Moscow agreements, would be in Soviet interests<...>.
Ambassador Schulenburg - at the German Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Top secret! Molotov told me today that the Soviet government believes that now the moment is ripe for it, as well as for the German government, to finally determine the structure of the Polish territories. In this regard, Molotov made it clear that the original intention, which was nurtured by the Soviet government and Stalin personally, to allow the existence of a remnant of Poland, had now given way to the intention to divide Poland along the Pissa-Narev-Vistula-San line.
The Soviet government wishes to immediately begin negotiations on this issue and conduct them in Moscow, since such negotiations on the Soviet side are obliged to be conducted by persons vested with the highest power who cannot leave the Soviet Union. I ask for telegraphic instructions. Schulenburg
Telegrams published in Soviet newspapers in December 1939
To Mr. Joseph Stalin, Moscow On the occasion of your sixtieth birthday, I ask you to accept my most sincere congratulations. With this I associate my best wishes, I wish good health to you personally, as well as a happy future to the peoples of the friendly Soviet Union. Adolf Gitler
Mr. Joseph Stalin Moscow Remembering the historical clock in the Kremlin, which marked the beginning of a decisive turn in relations between both great nations and thereby created the basis for a long-lasting friendship between them, I ask you to accept my warmest congratulations on the day of your sixtieth birthday. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister
To the Head of the German State, Mr. Adolf Hitler Berlin, I ask you to accept my gratitude for your congratulations and gratitude for your good wishes towards the peoples of the Soviet Union. I. Stalin
To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Mr. Joachim von Ribbentrop Berlin Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your congratulations. The friendship between the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, sealed with blood, has every reason to be long-lasting and strong. I. Stalin
Read in the next issue the documents declassified by the Security Service of Ukraine. They testify to the NKVD execution of captured Polish officers near Kharkov and the attempts of the USSR authorities to hide the burial - “A crime filled with alkali”
In the photo: German general Heinz Guderian and Soviet brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein in Brest-Litovsk are happy that the Polish gentlemen have come to a complete mess. September 22, 1939.
As you know, the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht, which began on September 1, 1939, was almost over by the middle of the month. On September 14, German units had already reached Brest-Litovsk, the citadel of which fell a few days later (this, by the way, was the first defense of the Brest Fortress in World War II). Only Warsaw and a few other scattered pockets continued to resist. However, the Polish army did not yet consider itself a complete loser, but hoped for something. And at that moment, on September 17, 1939 - suddenly - the valiant Red Army struck the remnants of the Polish army in the rear.
“The Polish-German war revealed the internal failure of the Polish state... Poland lost all its industrial areas and cultural centers... The Polish state and its government virtually ceased to exist. Thus, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland were terminated. Left to its own devices and left without leadership, Poland turned into a convenient field for all sorts of accidents and surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR... The Soviet government cannot be indifferent to the fact that half-blooded Ukrainians and Belarusians living on the territory of Poland, abandoned to the mercy of fate, “were left defenseless” - this is how Stalin justified the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939. Moreover, the cessation of the existence of the Polish government and state was announced when Warsaw - that is, the capital of this very state - was still defending itself.
But in principle, after being stabbed in the back by the Red Army, the Poles had no chance. By September 21, 217 thousand Poles were captured by the Soviets. The Poles put up their last fierce resistance in the area northwest of Lvov, where a small Polish group almost broke through the front of two Wehrmacht corps from September 21 to 26. The 4 thousand Poles who survived in this area preferred German captivity to Soviet captivity. On September 28, a Soviet-German friendship and border treaty was concluded in Moscow, which put an end to the occupation of Poland.
The Soviet people, as always, learned about everything after the fact. It is interesting to remember how this ambiguous situation was presented to the Soviet people. I offer several pictures on the theme from the Soviet children's magazine “Koster”, No. 10 for 1939.
A special article described how Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants lived terribly under the Polish lords, and how they rejoiced at the arrival of the Red Army.
A great gift, I think. 10-year-old Stasya Vasilevskaya worked as a laborer for a Polish landowner, and did not even think that one day the Red Army would come to visit her and show her a portrait of Stalin. And this is how it turned out. Lapota!
Interestingly, the articles dedicated to the event vividly describe how illiterate the peasants were in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine under the Polish lords. And only with the arrival of the Red Army they began to be taught to read and write. And then there is such a rush for newspapers from Moscow. Like a crush for meat sandwiches at a vegetarian banquet. It turns out that the peasants knew how to read.
Due to the inability of Soviet magazine publishing houses to quickly release their products (thick magazines took two to three months to prepare), in October No. 10 “Science and Life” for 1939 nothing was said about the events in Poland. But they made it to No. 11, damn it. At the same time, the issue came out as a double issue - both 11 and 12 at once. The issue opened with a powerful article:
Briefly - in just ten pages, the reader was told about why Stalin is Lenin today. By the way, I recommend not to forget this - Stalin is Lenin in 1939. And only so. Well, then there was an article on the topic of the day.
In general, it was as if the same group of authors wrote for the adult magazine “Science and Life” and the children’s “Kostra”.
Some other articles in this issue of N and Z acquired a militaristic tone. Even articles about botany.
And I also found an issue of the Pioneer magazine with an interpretation of events in Poland. Number 10 for 1939.
It is unknown who stole this picture from whom - “Bonfire” from “Pioneer” or vice versa. But it is not important.
And here is a terrible story from the Pioneer magazine about the atrocities of Polish officers.
By the way, the typesetter who allowed the last syllable to hang at the end of the paragraph should have been sent to the Gulag. But times were soft then. Therefore, in children's magazines, pioneers were sometimes forced to see the last line of a paragraph and the entire article, consisting of one syllable “ny.”
And in the same issue of Pioneer there was this useful article for Soviet pioneers:
In general, the Soviet people were shown in detail what happiness befell the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus when the Red Army came to visit them in the early morning of September 17, 1939.
And, by the way, do not forget, citizens, that the USSR entered World War II not on June 22, 1941, but on September 17, 1939.
In the photo: German general Heinz Guderian and Soviet brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein in Brest-Litovsk are happy that the Polish gentlemen have come to a complete mess. September 22, 1939.
As you know, the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht, which began on September 1, 1939, was almost over by the middle of the month. On September 14, German units had already reached Brest-Litovsk, the citadel of which fell a few days later (this, by the way, was the first defense of the Brest Fortress in World War II). Only Warsaw and a few other scattered pockets continued to resist. However, the Polish army did not yet consider itself a complete loser, but hoped for something. And at that moment, on September 17, 1939 - suddenly - the valiant Red Army struck the remnants of the Polish army in the rear.
“The Polish-German war revealed the internal failure of the Polish state... Poland lost all its industrial areas and cultural centers... The Polish state and its government virtually ceased to exist. Thus, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland were terminated. Left to its own devices and left without leadership, Poland turned into a convenient field for all sorts of accidents and surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR... The Soviet government cannot be indifferent to the fact that half-blooded Ukrainians and Belarusians living on the territory of Poland, abandoned to the mercy of fate, “were left defenseless” - this is how Stalin justified the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939. Moreover, the cessation of the existence of the Polish government and state was announced when Warsaw - that is, the capital of this very state - was still defending itself.
But in principle, after being stabbed in the back by the Red Army, the Poles had no chance. By September 21, 217 thousand Poles were captured by the Soviets. The Poles put up their last fierce resistance in the area northwest of Lvov, where a small Polish group almost broke through the front of two Wehrmacht corps from September 21 to 26. The 4 thousand Poles who survived in this area preferred German captivity to Soviet captivity. On September 28, a Soviet-German friendship and border treaty was concluded in Moscow, which put an end to the occupation of Poland.
The Soviet people, as always, learned about everything after the fact. It is interesting to remember how this ambiguous situation was presented to the Soviet people. I offer several pictures on the theme from the Soviet children's magazine “Koster”, No. 10 for 1939.
A special article described how Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants lived terribly under the Polish lords, and how they rejoiced at the arrival of the Red Army.
A great gift, I think. 10-year-old Stasya Vasilevskaya worked as a laborer for a Polish landowner, and did not even think that one day the Red Army would come to visit her and show her a portrait of Stalin. And this is how it turned out. Lapota!
Interestingly, the articles dedicated to the event vividly describe how illiterate the peasants were in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine under the Polish lords. And only with the arrival of the Red Army they began to be taught to read and write. And then there is such a rush for newspapers from Moscow. Like a crush for meat sandwiches at a vegetarian banquet. It turns out that the peasants knew how to read.
Due to the inability of Soviet magazine publishers to quickly release their products (thick magazines took two to three months to prepare), in October No. 10 “Science and Life” for 1939 nothing was said about the events in Poland. But they made it to No. 11, damn it. At the same time, the issue came out as a double issue - both 11 and 12. The issue opened with a powerful article:
Briefly - in just ten pages, the reader was told why Stalin is Lenin today. By the way, I recommend not to forget this - Stalin is Lenin in 1939. And only so. Well, then there was an article on the topic of the day.
In general, it was as if the same group of authors wrote for the adult magazine “Science and Life” and the children’s “Kostra”.
Some other articles in this issue of N and Z acquired a militaristic tone. Even articles about botany.
And I also found an issue of the Pioneer magazine with an interpretation of events in Poland. Number 10 for 1939.
It is unknown who stole this picture from whom – “Bonfire” from “Pioneer” or vice versa. But it is not important.
And here is a terrible story from the Pioneer magazine about the atrocities of Polish officers.
By the way, the typesetter who allowed the last syllable to hang at the end of the paragraph should have been sent to the Gulag. But times were soft then. Therefore, in children's magazines, pioneers were sometimes forced to see the last line of a paragraph and the entire article, consisting of one syllable “ny.”
And in the same issue of Pioneer there was this useful article for Soviet pioneers:
In general, the Soviet people were shown in detail what happiness befell the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus when the Red Army came to visit them in the early morning of September 17, 1939.
And, by the way, do not forget, citizens, that the USSR entered World War II not on June 22, 1941, but on September 17, 1939.
